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Through continued efforts like the Pan-Sahel Initiative of 2002 and 
subsequent Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership initiated in 2005, the 
State Department and Department of Defense struggle to leverage interagency 
partnerships and multinational cooperation within the Sahel region to wage war 
on terrorism and enhance regional peace and security. While these programs 
have made modest progress through mil-to-mil engagements and U.S.-led 
military exercises in the region, they fail to understand and address the full scope 
of regional security issues in the Sahel to include transnational organized crime 
and centuries-old regional sovereignty disputes. If policy makers hope to achieve 
and maintain true situational awareness in such a dynamic environment, they 
must leverage all available tools. In a region like the Sahel, where music is a 
foundational component of the cultural heritage and modern communication 
channels, ethnomusicology becomes a valuable tool with which to build 
situational awareness and enhance engagement with the population. 
This thesis draws from ethnomusicology research theory, intergroup 
psychology principles, and network convergence and communications theory to 
create a framework for regional security studies in order to better understand 
intergroup dynamics in the Sahel, and works as a tool to map networks in the 
region. Using Mali as a case study, it recommends the application of 
ethnomusicological analysis to identify and address legitimate grievances within 
the population that provide exploitable leverage points for regional bad actors. 
Further, it suggests using the existing peer-to-peer cell phone music sharing 
network in the Sahel to identify convergence nodes to target illicit networks in the 
region. 
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In November 2002, the State Department announced the Pan-Sahel 
Initiative (PSI) to assist Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania in detecting and 
responding to suspicious movement of people and goods across borders in the 
Sahel. Through training, equipment, and cooperation, the PSI sought to support 
two U.S. national security strategies in Africa by waging the war on terrorism and 
enhancing regional peace and security. The focal points of the initiative were 
fostering regional cooperation, countering terrorist organizations in the region, 
and promoting the United States’ European Command’s interest in the region 
through mil-to-mil engagements using U.S. Special Operations Forces.1 
Constrained by limited resources and focus, the PSI was replaced in 2005 by the 
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).2 The new multi-faceted, 
multi-year strategy expanded to integrate U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID), and Department of Defense (DOD) 
initiatives and increased spending up to almost $80 million per year. Unlike the 
PSI, TSCTP introduced a more comprehensive approach to regional security in 
the Sahel. 
Despite its expansion in funding and interagency participation, many 
experts criticized the TSCTP for a fundamental lack of understanding of 
extremism and criminality in the region. Additionally, critics accused African 
governments of taking advantage of perpetuated misconceptions of so-called 
ungoverned spaces in the desert to generate fears about violent extremism in 
order to obtain increased financial support for their underfunded militaries.3 
Finally, in 2012, critics’ fears were realized as northern Mali fell in to a state of 
Sharia law almost overnight. A nation that prided itself on religious tolerance and 
                                                 
1 John Pike, “Pan-Sahel Iniative (PSI),” GlobalSecurity.org, January 24, 2013, 1, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/pan-sahel.htm. 
2 Ibid., 3. 
3 John Pike, “Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP),” GlobalSecurity.org, 
January 24, 2013, 3, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/tscti.htm. 
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diversity, and famously considered music its number one export to the world, was 
helpless to prevent a complex chain reaction that led to the criminalization of all 
music. In the end, the reliance of the Malian people on their music, and the 
Jihadist’s failure to understand the foundational role of music in the cultural 
identity of the region, contributed to the ultimate failure of the Jihadist takeover.  
In 2016, the region remains unstable, and U.S. policy makers remain 
focused on fighting terrorism and promoting stability in the region, while a small 
but diverse and vocal community of local musicians and artists struggle to regain 
the cultural identity of their past, present, and future. Music still holds a unique 
role as a defining cohesive element in this otherwise disparate cultural 
landscape. From the Tuareg desert guitar rock made famous around the world by 
bands like Tinariwen to the Songhoy guitar blues of legendary artist Ali Farke 
Toure to the modern activist rap of Amkhoullel to the digital cell phone music 
being recorded and shared across the Sahel, music remains the defining element 
of Malian nationality to its citizens and to the world. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 The steady increase in instability across the Sahel region over the past 
decade and the potential threat this instability presents to global security 
necessitate a continued and comprehensive study of the region. Researchers 
seeking to effectively understand the people and intergroup dynamics of the 
Sahel must identify and evaluate communication channels and they must 
consider the cultural identity of the region in order to accurately understand and 
integrate messaging within the Sahel to promote stability and counter violent 
extremism. The study of music provides both a unique insight into the 
communication methods and networks of a region as well as a more nuanced 
understanding of the cultural framework of the region. By failing to incorporate a 
technical and behavioral understanding of music as a component of analysis in 
Sahel nations like Mali, where music is a foundational component of cultural 
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heritage and modern communication, researchers risk never obtaining a 
complete grasp of the situation on the ground. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
How can knowledge gained through the incorporation of ethnomusicology 
into regional security analysis of the Sahel be used to promote stability and 
counter violent extremism? How can understanding local and regional music 
initiatives be leveraged to expand outreach programs in the Sahel? Can an 
interdisciplinary approach using a framework based on a theoretical research 
model for ethnomusicology be applied successfully to regional security studies in 
the Sahel? Can the practice of sharing music files via direct phone to phone 
Bluetooth transmission be used to map trade or travel networks in the Sahel? If 
so, how should this information be leveraged to either target illicit networks or 
enhance positive messaging in the Sahel? 
D. ANALYSIS 
This thesis will consider Western policy attempts to combat terrorism and 
promote stability in the Sahel region and question whether these efforts were 
misguided or at least underinformed in addressing regional issues. By exploring 
principles of ethnomusicology, psychological impacts of music and 
multiculturalism, network analysis, and communication flow theories, this thesis 
offers a framework for incorporating an understanding of regional music 
dynamics to enhance regional counter violent extremism (CVE) policy. Borrowing 
from ethnomusicologist Alan P. Merriam’s concept of technical, academic, and 
social responsibilities of ethnomusicology, this research suggests a map-lens-
bridge approach to map illicit networks, observe multicultural dynamics, and 
engage marginalized communities through music in the Sahel. Ultimately, this 
thesis recommends that the proposed ethnomusicological approach to CVE be 
integrated into existing counter terrorism policy as a catalyst for expansion to a 
whole-of-nation approach to CVE that ensures coherence between government 
and private-sector programs in the Sahel. 
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E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis makes the following recommendations: 
1. Adopt a whole-of-nation approach modeled after cyber 
security or fragile state policy: As recent reports have shown, 
TSCTP has been successful achieving multi-agency cooperation 
for a whole-of-government approach via the 3Ds: defense, 
diplomacy, and development. To maximize results, the program 
should identify whole-of-nation or private-sector activities that are 
operating relative to each of its lines of effort and leverage the 3Cs 
to ensure non-governmental and private efforts in the region are 
coherent, coordinated, and complementary to TSCTP efforts. 
2. Draft a strategy to implement ethnomusicology as a 
fundamental element of the whole-of-nation approach: The 
ethnomusicology aspect could be implemented as either a separate 
line of effort synchronizing government, NGO, and private-sector 
engagement through music. Alternatively, ethnomusicology could 
be incorporated into the “counter spread of violent extremist 
ideologies” line of effort. 
3. Fund an ethnomusicologist advisor to TSCTP’s Standing 
Interagency Working Group (SIWG): The SIWG meets monthly in 
Washington, DC, and monitors resource allocation, interagency 
coordination, and strategic objectives. Absent a permanently 
funded staff organization for TSCTP, this working group would be 
the best place for a dedicated ethnomusicologist. 
4. Fund grants for the U.S. private-sector music industry to 
engage with the Mali music industry: The research supports the 
notion that Malians consider music as one of their staple exports. 
Therefore, a healthy relationship between the Western music 
industry and the musicians, producers, and venues of Mali should 
be a foundational aspect of U.S. economic exchange with Mali. By 
funding grants to support private and academic music projects, 
TSCTP can promote coherence and coordination and more 
focused government activities through Voices of America or USAID. 
5. Support reestablishment of Festival au Desert in Timbuktu: 
Prior to 2012, the Festival au Desert was the dominant international 
symbol for northern Mali and Mali as a whole. Resumption of the 
annual festival alone is a worthy objective of counterterrorism policy 
in the Sahel, and once resumed, the festival will facilitate continued 
whole-of-nation engagement opportunities in the long term. This 
objective also provides an opportunity to synchronize government 
activities, like border security and law enforcement with non-
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government and private activities, such as the production and 
management of the festival. 
6. Fund research and development for tracking file transfer over 
Bluetooth or cellular networks: The development and 
implementation of technology to track discrete digital artifacts 
through the cellular networks in the Sahel could be funded through 
government agencies like the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency or the Office of the Secretary of Defense Joint 
Test and Evaluation. Alternatively, private-sector innovation could 
be leveraged through the new DOD “venture capital” arm, Defense 
Innovation Unit Experimental. 
F. CONCLUSION 
If existing counter terrorism policy in the Sahel can be expanded to 
incorporate private-sector and non-governmental organizations’ efforts in the 
region, then the overall effectiveness of existing government programs will be 
maximized. In a region like the Sahel, where the geopolitical and cultural 
dynamics create a unique reliance on music and oral history to affect 
communication flow in the absence of technological means, ethnomusicology 
becomes instrumental in helping to map the cultural geography. Any attempt to 
understand the underlying multicultural dynamics in the Sahel as they pertain to 
CVE will likely be incomplete if they do not incorporate the role of music in the 
region. This thesis attempts to merge disparate disciplines into a comprehensive 
framework for incorporating ethnomusicology as the cornerstone of an expanded 
whole-of-nation approach to counter violent extremism policy in the Sahel.  
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 1 
I. THE DAY THE JIHAD CAME 
Music guides the whole of our society. The proof is that the griot 
became so institutional. He was like a judge, a lawyer, a federator, 
who calmed quarrels in the old days. Everything in Mali involves 
music, even funerals. Music regulates the life of a Malian, from 
ancient days until today. 
 —Cheikh Tidiane Seck1 
 
In April 2012, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad 
(MNLA), a group of Tuareg separatists in northern Mali, joined forces with Ansar 
ud-Dine and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), a 
militant Islamist Tuareg group believed to have ties with Al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM). Together, their fighters stormed the northern Mali towns of 
Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu. Capitalizing upon chaos created following a recent 
military coup within the Mali government, the rebels were able to swiftly take 
control of the northern desert region of Mali and soon announced the 
establishment of the independent Tuareg state of Azawad. A state flag was 
established and social media sites exploded with a fervor of pro-Tuareg 
sentiment and pride. 
Soon however, tensions grew between the MNLA and the Islamists over 
the imposing of Sharia law in Azawad. On June 25, 2012, Ansar ud-Dine and 
MUJAO defeated the secular Tuareg forces of the MNLA at the Battle of Gao, 
driving them back in to the desert and achieving complete control of the urban 
centers of northern Mali.2 What followed was 10 months of harsh Sharia law 
imposed on a heretofore secular, moderate, multicultural society whose cultural 
heritage revolved around music and oral tradition. One morning in August 2012, 
                                                 
1 Andy Morgan, Music, Culture and Conflict in Mali (Copenhagen: Freemuse, 2013), 53. 
2 Joshua Hammer, “When the Jihad Came to Mali,” New York Review of Books, March 21, 
2013, 8, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/mar/21/when-jihad-came-mali/. 
 2 
the newly empowered MUJAO leadership broadcast the following announcement 
from mosques across the Islamist-controlled Azawad: 
We, the mujahedeen of Gao, of Timbuktu and Kidal, henceforward 
forbid the broadcasting of any Western music on all radios in this 
Islamic territory. This ban takes effect from today, Wednesday. We 
do not want Satan’s music. In its place there will be Quranic verses. 
Shari’a demands this. What God commands must be done.3 
The circumstances and events surrounding northern Mali’s spiral into 
Sharia law provides a unique case study on complex intergroup dynamics. Even 
after the fact, understanding exactly what took place in northern Mali in 2012 
requires a deep understanding of the cultural and social dynamics at play in this 
diverse region, past and present. Nowhere is this complex cultural landscape 
displayed as well as through the music that has, for ages, defined the heritage of 
the many peoples occupying the Sahel region of the Sahara, from the banks of 
the Niger to the mountainous border of Algeria. The resulting musical landscape 
is as complex as the cultural landscape that produces it, and as a result it 
provides researchers and analysts an excellent window into the collective soul of 
the region. 
My research will set out to determine how a better understanding of the 
musical culture of a region such as northern Mali can educate a larger discourse 
on how to engage that community to prevent radicalization and counter violent 
extremism (CVE). What role, if any, does music play in promoting or countering 
violent extremism? How can knowledge of the role of music be used to assess a 
certain population’s vulnerability to radicalization? Can this knowledge be 
leveraged to influence the intergroup dynamics within populations to prevent 
violent extremism? If so, what are the ethical implications of doing so? 
In the end, it was arguably the Malian peoples’ impenetrable bond to their 
musical heritage, and the Islamists’ failure to understand this deep relationship 
                                                 
3 Morgan, Music, Culture and Conflict in Mali, 13. 
 3 
between the Malians and their music and culture, that led to the ultimate failure of 
the AQIM effort to control the people. At least for now … 
Everything is transmitted in Mali through music, through poetry. We 
enjoy life through music. The MUJAO can exist but not among this 
people. And I don’t see how, in the 21st century, they’ll manage to 
occupy the entire territory without the support of the people who live 
there. So, that declaration of theirs, instead of making me panic, at 
least it tells me that we’re dealing with people who don’t know what 
they’re doing, who aren’t serious and who won’t win. Because they 
are aiming for Utopia. They don’t understand the culture that they 
are operating in and they don’t try and understand it either. And 
most importantly, they’re not in harmony with the population. 
— Manny Ansar, the director of the Festival au Desert4 
  
                                                 
4 Morgan, Music, Culture and Conflict in Mali, 29–30. 
 4 
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II. INTRODUCTION 
Today, as never before, governmental agencies of the nations of 
the world are recognizing the fact that international understanding 
and goodwill is possible only when the cultural expressions of the 
peoples involved are comprehended. To this end the 
ethnomusicologist must set for himself exacting standards worthy of 
his responsibility. 
 —Mantle Hood, Ethnomusicologist, 19575 
 
Almost a decade and a half into the U.S. Global War on Terror, it is 
difficult to point to any tangible metrics that would indicate that the U.S. strategy 
in this effort has been successful. Despite having spent billions of U.S. dollars 
and fighting two major wars, the United States faces a global environment that is 
as volatile and uncertain as ever, and the “terrorist” enemy continues to adapt 
and survive despite our best efforts to eliminate it. Nowhere is this more clearly 
demonstrated than in the United States’ efforts to counter violent extremism in 
trans-Saharan Northwest Africa. Hundreds of millions of dollars have been 
dispersed the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and its 
predecessor the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) yet, by all accounts, terrorism in the 
region has increased significantly since the programs’ inceptions in 2005.6 
Porous borders, rampant government corruption, large disenfranchised 
populations, and transnational criminal networks continue to make the Sahel and 
Maghreb regions of Northwest Africa vulnerable to the spread of violent 
extremism. In 2012, these elements converged in the north of Mali and triggered 
a rapid decline into Sharia law in a region of a country that had previously been 
considered the gold standard for post-colonial development in West Africa. 
                                                 
5 Mantle Hood, “Training and Research Methods in Ethnomusicology,” Ethnomusicology 
Newsletter, no. 11 (1957): 8. 
6 Government Accountability Office, Combating Terrorism: U.S. Efforts in Northwest Africa 
Would Be Strengthened by Enhanced Program Management (GAO-14-518) (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office), 3, accessed September 5, 2016, http://www.gao.gov/
assets/670/664337.pdf. 
 6 
Despite significant setbacks like those seen in northern Mali and the overall 
ineffectiveness of policies that have been pursued steadily for over a decade, the 
U.S. strategic approach to countering violent extremism in Northwest Africa 
appears fundamentally unchanged. Failure by U.S. policy makers to identify and 
address failed policy and to explore new innovative solutions for engaging the 
root causes of violent extremism will most certainly lead to continued lackluster 
counterterrorism operations in the region and continued threat to regional and 
global national interests. This research will explore whether the methods of 
inquiry and frameworks of analysis used by ethnomusicologists can be directly 
and indirectly applied to enhance U.S. efforts to counter violent extremism. 
A. U.S. TRANS-SAHARAN SECURITY POLICY: WHAT IS WORKING AND 
WHAT IS NOT? 
U.S. counter-terrorism operations in the Sahel began shortly after 9/11, 
and while they have grown to become more regional and embrace a whole-of-
government approach (WoGA) over time, the underlying strategy continues to be 
heavily dependent on Department of Defense (DOD) operations and fails to 
integrate with non-governmental organizations or private industry in a whole-of-
nation approach (WoNA). The Pan Sahel Initiative, a precursor to the TSCTP, 
executed an annual budget of $7.75M between 2002 and 2004 to train partner 
nation counterterrorism (CT) forces in Mali, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger.7 In 
January 2004, U.S. Ambassadors to Algeria, Mali, Morocco, Niger, and Tunisia 
identified the need for a comprehensive regional approach to countering 
terrorism that went beyond training regional security forces to include 
development assistance and public diplomacy.8 As a result, the TSCTP was 
founded in 2005. The State Department–led multiagency program focuses on the 
“3Ds” of diplomacy, defense, and development and covers 10 countries in the 
region: Mali, Chad, Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia, and 
                                                 
7 Lesley Anne Warner, “The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership: Building Partner 
Capacity to Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism,” Center for Complex Operations, March 
2014, 22, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/CRM-2014-U-007203-Final.pdf. 
8 Ibid., 23. 
 7 
Burkina Faso. According to the joint 2014 TSCTP strategy, the TSCTP purpose 
statement is to “assist partners in northwest Africa to increase immediate and 
long-term capabilities to address terrorist threats.”9 The State Department, DOD, 
and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) coordinate 
operations along the following five lines of effort as depicted in Figure 1: build law 
enforcement capacity, support efforts to counter terrorist financing, reinforce 
military capacity to counterterrorism, enhance regional capacity to secure 
borders, and counter the spread of violent extremist ideology.10 Despite what 
appears to be a comprehensive multi-agency regional approach to addressing 
violent extremism in the Sahel, the program has struggled to achieve anticipated 
results.  
 
Figure 1.  TSCTP Lines of Effort11 
If the recent surge in government-funded assessments of TSCTP is any 
indication, it would appear that government stakeholders may be acknowledging 
                                                 
9 “Combating Terrorism: U.S. Efforts in Northwest Africa Would Be Strengthened by 
Enhanced Program Management,” 21. 
10 Government Accountability Office, “Combating Terrorism,” 20. 
11 Source: Ibid., 21. 
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the strategic shortcomings of TSCTP and attempting to regroup. In 2014 alone, 
three reports were published. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
provided a report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, titled 
Combating Terrorism: U.S. Efforts in Northwest Africa Would Be Strengthened by 
Enhanced Program Management,12 the National Defense University Center for 
Complex Operations and the Strategic Studies division of CNA corporation 
released a study titled The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership: Building 
Partner Capacity to Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism,13 and USAID 
contracted Dexis Consulting Group to write the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 
Partnership Evaluative Study.14 In general, these studies acknowledge that the 
TSCTP has made improvements in terms of interagency coordination, but cite 
numerous findings related to overall program management and tracking of 
funding and progress, which are not particularly relevant to this research. Rather, 
this research will attempt to zero in on operational findings highlighted in these 
reports and other academic assessments on U.S. counter violent extremism 
operations in northwest Africa.  
Critics of the TSCTP tend to highlight three general themes. First, they 
argue that the program is overly focused on symptoms of violent extremism in 
the Sahel and Maghreb without properly addressing more foundational issue like 
governance, corruption, and state legitimacy, which would support more 
sustainable program impact. Second, many contend that despite its “whole-of-
government approach” the TSCTP over-prioritizes DOD programs and therefore 
under-resources other programs focused on de-radicalization and religious 
tolerance initiatives.15 This thesis will take this one step further and argue that 
                                                 
12 Government Accountability Office, “Combating Terrorism,” 21. 
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Evaluative Study,” United States Agency for International Development, April15, 2014, 1, http://
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U.S. strategy in the Sahel and Maghreb should follow current trends in cyber 
security strategies and move beyond “whole-of-government” to a “whole-of-
nation” approach to CVE in the Sahel. Finally, there is criticism that the TSCTP’s 
bilateral approach does not go far enough to address the transnational nature of 
violent extremism in the region and that more emphasis should be placed on 
establishing regional organizations to tackle regional violent extremism.16 This 
research supports this recommendation but will focus primarily on policy 
proposals as they pertain to Mali, while acknowledging that success in the region 
ultimately depends on a comprehensive regional approach.  
B. A POLICY SHIFT FOR COUNTERING TRANS-SAHARAN VIOLENT 
EXTREMISM: WHOLE OF NATION VERSUS WHOLE OF 
GOVERNMENT 
By focusing primarily on a whole-of-government approach (WoGA), 
programs like TSCTP are not fully leveraging non-government actors that are 
critical to successful CVE. Alternatively, the whole-of-systems approach (WoSA), 
and whole-of-nation approach (WoNA) that developed in response to the popular 
whole-of-government approach can help TSCTP achieve its goals. WoSA arose 
when civil society–based and humanitarian aid organizations, recognizing a 
limitation in WoGA, resisted attempts to be integrated as if they were government 
or state agencies, and proposed WoSA as an alternative. According to Alexander 
Klimburg, a senior adviser at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, “these 
groups argued that it was equally important to encourage international horizontal 
cooperation of similar actors, such as those involved in humanitarian aid.”17 In 
contrast to the “3D” approach espoused by WoGA, and TSCTP for that matter, 
proponents of WoSA offered their own “3C” approach of “coherent, coordinated, 
and complementary.” Ultimately, whole of government and whole-of-systems 
approaches left little room for private sector actors, and so the whole-of-nation 
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approach developed as a third dimension for bilateral or multilateral integration. 
Just as WoSA did for non-government or multinational public institutions, WoNA 
allows for horizontal integration between like private-sector actors as part of a 
three-dimensional framework of coordinated integration between government, 
non-government, and private-sector actors to achieve a common objective.18 
As an analogy, recent cyber-security policy has embraced WoNA a 
requirement to maximize effects in an environment dominated by private-sector 
actors. In his attempt to develop a three-dimensional framework for cyber power, 
Klimburg acknowledges that “cyber power policy discussions can be informed by 
the experiences on the ground in Iraq. This is especially the case as both ‘cyber 
power’ and so-called ‘Fragile States’ policies have one variable in common: the 
importance of non-state actors.”19 And so, in a kind of circular logic, TSCTP 
policies would be wise to re-borrow from cyber power policy, what cyber power 
policy may have borrowed from fragile state policy, to address fragile state and 
governance issues in northwest Africa. In order to meet its full potential, the 
TSCTP must look beyond the single dimension of interagency cooperation 
between government actors and expand to a three-dimensional integration 
strategy that includes integrated systems capability as well as integrated national 
capability. This research is primarily interested in the latter. 
C. AQIM AND THE DYNAMIC NATURE OF TRANS-SAHARAN 
TERRORIST GROUPS 
Any endeavor to fully understand the complex multi-group dynamics at 
play in Mali and the broader Sahel must be grounded in an understanding of the 
history, interests, and motivations of the groups operating there. In general, and 
for the purpose of this research, there are three categories of actors whose 
interactions led to the 2012 coup and Islamist takeover and are still impacting the 
environment today. Those categories are Islamist violent extremist organizations 
                                                 
18 Klimburg, “The Whole of Nation in Cyberpower,” 172. 
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(VEO), Tuareg independence groups, and to a smaller degree, the Malian central 
government and its military. Naturally, these groups are operating within or above 
the multicultural population of moderate Malians, who up until the coup had been 
lauded as a gold standard for post-colonization ethnic tolerance in West Africa, 
and who do not claim membership to any of the abovementioned categories. As 
one would expect, these categorizations are grossly over simplified, and as we 
will see, there are group dynamics at work within these categories and often the 
distinction between these categories can be blurred with respect to certain 
organizations and their objectives. Ultimately, this research will suggest that 
ethnomusicology can provide a useful tool as part of a comprehensive analysis of 
actors in a region of interest. What follows is a brief overview of the organizations 
relevant to the events in northern Mali, starting with a history of Al Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the overall lack of regional consensus on how to 
eliminate or even label this organization. 
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is the latest manifestation of an armed 
Islamist movement that began in Algeria over two decades ago. Through its 
evolution, AQIM has demonstrated characteristics of, and in fact been labeled as, 
an Islamist insurgency, a jihadi terrorist movement, and a criminal organization. 
Today, the organization incorporates aspects of each, and the lack of consensus 
on how to properly define AQIM impedes the effort to reach a multinational 
consensus on how to respond to AQIM. Understanding AQIM’s transformational 
stages, the driving forces behind evolution, and the influence each of these 
stages has on AQIM as an organization today, is critical to comprehending its 
objectives and thus critical to developing an effective course of action for dealing 
with the threat that AQIM poses nationally, regionally, and potentially, globally.  
Although AQIM’s initial manifestation, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), was 
not formally founded until October 1992, its true origin dates back as far as 1982, 
as a result of disenfranchisement of Islamist Algerians both at home and abroad 
in Afghanistan. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, many 
Algerians heeded the resulting call to jihad and joined a wave of Arab–Afghan 
 12 
fighters traveling to Afghanistan and Pakistan for the Islamic revolution. Within 
this group of Arab–Afghans from many countries across Africa, the Middle East, 
and Europe, the Algerians developed a strong in-group. According to Jamal al-
Fadl, a former Al-Qaeda member, “The Algerians hung around in their group 
mostly. Not that they didn’t mix with other people but they mostly hung around 
with their group of Algerians…they were separate.”20 As the Afghan jihad came 
to a close, 1,000 to 1,500 hardened mujahedeen veterans were forced to return 
to Algeria, sharing the bond of jihad and eager to continue the struggle.21 
Meanwhile, in Algeria, discontent with the secular rulings of the Algerian 
government, Islamic militant Mustafa Bouyali formed the Algerian Islamic 
Movement (MIA), a secret terror cell engaged in guerrilla warfare against the 
government in the early 1980s.22 Bouyali’s guerilla struggle became popular 
among returning Afghan–Arabs and young Islamists dissatisfied with the lack of 
results achieved by Islamic political parties such as the Islamic Salvation Front 
(FIS). Ultimately, the lack of ontological security for Islamists under the secular 
government and a lack of faith in the ability of the FIS to achieve power set the 
stage for the joining forces of the MIA and the returning Arab–Afghans 
mujahedeen. Finally, in response to the secular government’s canceling of the 
1992 general elections, Algerian Islamic militants joined for conference in 
October 1992 and created the GIA, which expanded rapidly and gained political 
strength.23 
Fueled by the jihadi motives of the many Afghan-Arabs in the GIA, the 
organization began to identify itself as an alternative to the weak FIS and began 
strictly interpreting Islamic law and exacting harsh revenge on those who did not 
support the GIA or its values. In addition to targeting locals sympathetic to the 
                                                 
20 Evan F. Kohlmann, “Two Decades of Jihad in Algeria: The GIA, the GSPC, and Al-Qaida,” 




23 Ibid., 4. 
 13 
Algerian government, the GIA also began targeting foreign assets within Algeria 
that they determined to be threats to the GIA’s new jihad, and by the mid-1990s, 
the GIA was indiscriminately killing Algerian civilians and kidnapping foreigners. 
As the GIA ideology became stronger, they began to reinforce their defined in-
group by more broadly defining and attacking their out-group. In a 1996 
communique, then GIA leader Djamel Zitouni stated,  
The GIA has fought all Unbelievers of all ethnicities and groups… 
and so we have cut them off from the security of living in Algeria 
and allowed the spilling of their blood if they stay in our land…only 
those whose presence is essential to fight Muslims and Islam have 
stayed behind. Among those are politicians, military personnel, and 
missionaries.24 
 By acknowledging the importance of denying security to the Unbelievers, 
defining the GIA out-group as simply any foreigner who remains in Algeria, and 
then using that out-group identification to justify the killing of innocents by any 
GIA members or supporters, this passage demonstrates the extreme 
transformation of the Algerian Islamist movement from the politically driven FIS to 
the fanatically driven GIA shortly before its collapse. 
A combination of factors brought on the collapse of the GIA and the rise of 
the Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat (GSPC) in its place. Initially, the GIA 
employed terrorist tactics as an instrument to achieve specific objectives: 
kidnapping French Monks for ransom, hijacking French airliners for global 
attention, and attacking foreign interests in Algeria. Over time, however, the GIA 
adopted an organizational use of terrorism. Unlike the instrumental approach, the 
organizational approach assumes that group survival is the primary goal of 
individuals or leaders within the group, as opposed to ideology. Major 
characteristics of an organizational approach to terrorism include internal 
factionalism, targeting based on organizational dynamics versus ideology, and 
continued use of terrorism until the group disintegrates, even if it achieves minor 
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goals.25 We see all of these characteristics in the fall of the GIA. The Algerian 
government responded swiftly and severely to the GIA threat of terrorism and as 
a result, the reign of GIA leaders tended to be short,26 and the rapid turnover 
drove factionalism due to complex loyalties and power struggles within the group. 
Furthermore, the organization became embroiled in “tit-for-tat” battles with 
Algerian government forces that did little to forward their cause.27 As GIA leader 
Djamel Zitouni’s ideology and methodology became more rogue, he alienated 
more of his followers but continued to execute terrorist operations including 
massacres that killed innocent Algerian Muslims and even fellow jihadists. 
Following Zitouni’s assassination at the hands of fellow members of GIA, his 
successor, Antar Zouabri, continued GIA’s downward spiral, ultimately publishing 
a fatwa against the entire Islamic population of Algeria for not supporting GIA. 
In the wake of GIA’s demise, a new organization, the Salafist Group for 
Prayer and Combat, formed in 1999 under the following ideology: 
The GSPC is a military organization, following the Salafist creed 
and ideology, fighting in Jihad against the Algerian Regime which 
has abandoned Islam and its masters among the Jews and 
Christians (in order) to restore the rightly guided Caliphate and to 
implement Sharia… The GSPC is not limited by a narrow regional 
vision. It is important for us to spread the fragrance of jihad in every 
country and region, and ignite flames under the feet of the Jews, 
Christians, and apostates.28 
The GSPC enjoyed significant recruiting increases after Al Qaeda’s attack on 9/
11, and their decision to become an African franchise for Al Qaeda in September 
2006 was rooted in several aspects of social identity theory. For example, by 
exploiting a patron-client relationship with Al Qaeda, GSPC is now able to 
leverage funding and resources from Al Qaeda in return for executing operations 
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domestically in Algeria as well as in Europe. By returning to a more institutional 
terrorism structure, the GSPC has aligned its organizational ideology and 
operational targeting with those of the broader Al-Qaeda organization, thus 
continuing the expansion of its “outgroup” beyond the population of Algeria. 
Finally, the evolving nature of the GSPC and the lack of consensus on 
how to categorize the Algerian jihadist movement creates problems for efforts to 
counter the organization. First, the Algerian government has realized benefits 
through the existence of a global terrorist organization within its borders. Algeria 
has enjoyed the surge in counterterrorism efforts, tripling its defense budget in 
just three years to $5.3 billion in 2009. U.S. military exports to Algeria nearly 
quadrupled in the decade after 9/11, reaching $800 million.29 Furthermore, the 
Algerian military used the presence of a credible but intangible jihadist threat 
within Algeria to validate its existence and perpetuate the authoritarianism of the 
Algerian government.30 As the influence of AQIM spills beyond the borders of 
Algeria in to the Maghreb and Sahel regions of Africa, other African nations react 
to AQIM actions in accordance with their own perception of the AQIM 
organization, which in turn puts pressure on Algeria to take a less militaristic 
approach to AQIM. Until the regional forces in the Sahel and Maghreb can find 
common ground and demilitarize their response to AQIM, it is unlikely that they 
will effectively address AQIM.  
Ultimately, three Islamic armed groups controlled the north of Mali from 
April 2012 to January 2013: AQIM, its West African splinter-group; the Movement 
for Oneness and jihad in West Africa (MUJAO); and an Islamist militia named 
Ansar ud-Dine. The lines between these groups are blurred, and according to 
Tinariwen band manager-turned-journalist, Andy Morgan, “each have their own 
back story, ethnic mix, leaders and agenda, but there’s evidence of considerable 
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coordination and resource sharing between them.”31 Having discussed AQIM, 
and its Algerian roots, let us consider its black African and Tuareg offshoots, 
MUJAO and Ansar ud-Dine, before moving on to the more moderate Tuareg 
independence organizations involved. 
In 2011, the Movement for Oneness and jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) 
broke from AQIM allegedly due to the marginalization of black Africans under the 
primarily Algerian AQIM leadership.32 Ironically, parallels might be drawn 
between this AQIM split and the divide in Mali between black Africans in the 
south and Tuaregs in the north. MUJAO set out to spread jihad further in to West 
Africa but have primarily been operating in northern Mali and southern Algeria 
since the split. A 2012 video made ideological references to the likes of Osama 
bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar, but primary emphasis was made on 
historic West African Islamic leaders claiming, “We are the ideological 
descendants of Ousman Dan Fodio, El Hadj Omar Tall and Amadou Cheikhou, 
who all fought colonial invaders… Today, we are inaugurating jihad in West 
Africa.”33 In July 2012, under the leadership of former Mauritanian criminal 
Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou, MUJAO took the eastern city of Gao by 
ejecting the Tuareg nationalist MNLA via fierce fighting. MUJAO held power in 
Gao under strict Sharia law until January 26, 2013, when French troops forcefully 
removed them, with support from the Malian army.34  
The third and most pivotal Islamist group controlling the north was Ansar 
ud-Dine or “Defenders of the Way,” led by Iyad Ag Ghaly, a legendary Tuareg 
leader from the dominant “aristocratic” tribe of the Ifoghas, who had effectively 
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ruled the far northeast of Mali since the 1800s.35 Ag Ghaly led the Tuareg 
rebellion in 1990 and ultimately signed the peace accord with the Malian central 
government, securing numerous promises of development for the northeast that 
in the end were never fulfilled by the central government.36 Ag Ghaly established 
himself as a legitimate political figure in Mali and the Sahel, and over the coming 
years negotiated with GSPC on behalf of the Malian government to secure the 
release of 15 European hostages in northern Mali. He also represented the 
Malian government as a special advisor to the Malian consulate in Saudi 
Arabia.37  
 Ag Ghaly had become an important node in a vast network of 
power and influence that stretched from Jeddah to Nouakchott, 
from Tripoli to Niamey and included presidents, ministers, military 
chiefs, secret service agents, jihadists, tribal leaders, war lords and 
mafia. In short, he was a man who could not be ignored.38  
 Unfortunately for the people of northern Mali, the growing Tuareg 
independence movement in 2011 did just that. The new groups of young Tuaregs 
streaming into Mali from the crumbling Libyan Army converged with young 
Tuareg activists in the north and planned for the coming rebellion. For ethnic and 
historical reasons, Iyad Ag Ghaly was sidelined from the endeavor. Thus, he 
formed Ansar ud-Dine and allied with AQIM, leveraging the relationships, wealth 
and influence he had built over the previous decades. And so it was in the spring 
of 2012, that 
 
 MUJAO became the masters of GAO, AQIM of Timbuktu and 
Ansar ud-Dine of Kidal. Ansar ud-Dine with its “local” Tuareg face, 
however, became a convenient “front” organization for the mainly 
foreign forces of AQIM and MUJAO throughout the territory. The 
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three organizations divided the spoils. The Salafist take-over of 
northern Mali was complete.39  
D. TUAREG INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT 
At the heart of the events that unfolded in March 2012 was a decades-
long conflict between the disenfranchised Tuaregs in the north and the primarily 
black African central government in Bamako. The influx of Tuareg fighters from 
Libya, laden with heavy weaponry, provided fuel to the fire of a long and enduring 
list of Tuareg grievances. On January 17, 2012, the Tuareg-led National 
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), rebelled in the town of Menaka 
in east Mali on the border of Niger, opening just another chapter in a Tuareg 
resistance that began in 1963 when Tuaregs rebelled against Bamako.40 The 
rebellion broke out again in 1990 and as recently as 2006.41 The 2012 uprising 
put pressure on Malian military stationed in the north who were feeling isolated 
and under resourced. Finally, in March, Malian Army Captain Amadou Sonogou 
led a successful military coup against the central government driving the 
democratically elected president Amadou Toumani Toure into hiding, less than a 
month before scheduled elections would have forced his departure anyway. 
Seeing their opportunity, the MNLA declared an independent Tuareg Azawad 
state in the absence of a central Malian government. A flag of Azawad was 
established, Tuaregs took to social media to celebrate their new Tuareg national 
identity, and for a short while, the Tuaregs of northern Mali had regained the 
glory of the Berber Empire. The glory was short-lived. Tensions grew between 
the MNLA and their more extreme bedfellows, and as mentioned earlier, the 
MNLA lost control of northern Mali’s cities to Ansar ud-Dine and MUJAO 
following the Battle of Gao. 
So, to summarize in the most general terms, the five major players leading 
up to the 2012 Islamist takeover were: 1) the “Algerian” jihadist group, AQIM, 2) 
                                                 




the “black African” jihadist group, MUJAO, 3) the “Tuareg” jihadist group, Ansur 
ud-Dine, 4) the “moderate” Tuareg independence group, MNLA, and 5) the “black 
African” central government of Mali. One might be forgiven for lumping Tuareg 
MNLA factions in with their fellow Tuareg Islamist extremists, but to do so was to 
miss the opportunity to address valid grievances among moderate but 
disenfranchised Tuaregs and to therefore leave a ripe population for the Salafi 
jihadists to recruit, mobilize, and ultimately take advantage of in northern Mali. 
Tuaregs in the north were hungry for change, perhaps even a form of jihad, but 
not the one they got… 
That Jihad was nurtured in an entirely different mental landscape, 
one that had been hardened and brutalized by years of guerrilla 
conflict in Algeria and fuelled by an extreme and pitiless worldview 
more common to places like Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, 
Yemen and Saudi Arabia than Mali. The population of the north 
craved for security but not religious fanaticism. However, in the 
end, they had no choice in the matter.42 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Ultimately, this research recommends a three-pronged map-lens-bridge 
framework for utilization of ethnomusicological analysis as an innovative element 
of a revamped policy approach to counterterrorism in northwest Africa. As a 
“map,” ethnomusicology research in the combined digital-analog communications 
environment of the Sahel provides a tool to map networks and human geography 
that can be useful in many complex environments, but particularly in the Sahel, 
where music is a foundational element of the culture, past and present. As a 
“lens,” ethnomusicology provides yet another analysis framework by which 
researchers and policy makers can seek to understand a particular culture or 
community. And finally as a “bridge,” ethnomusicology and engagement through 
music provide a potent tool for energizing public- and private-sector exchanges 
through music and the music industry. This research suggests the new strategy 
must be a whole-of-nation versus whole-of-government approach, and the 
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framework presented herein represents just one of many tools that could be 
leveraged within this approach. 
First, this thesis builds a foundational understanding through a review of 
the literature on ethnomusicology as an academic field, the psychological effects 
of music on individuals and groups, and the communication theory as it pertains 
to the Sahel and Maghreb. Then, the concepts borrowed from each of these 
disciplines will be synthesized in an attempt to build a framework for applying 
ethnomusicology to countering violent extremism in a map-lens-bridge approach 
to lines of effort. At the heart of this research are three models for concept 
validation that are presented to show how digital music and associated digital 
media can be analyzed and tracked to map networks. Then, a brief review of 
Malian music is presented to demonstrate the value of ethnomusicology research 
as a lens to understanding the musical messaging patters of a population. 
Finally, the thesis explores citizen diplomacy and whole-of-nation options for 
leveraging music as a bridge for engaging at-risk populations. Ultimately, these 
findings are coalesced into a brief set of recommendations for TSCTP and other 
policy initiatives seeking to counter violent extremism in the musically rich 
environment of the Sahel. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. THE HARMLESS DRUDGE: UNDERSTANDING THE HISTORY OF 
ETHNOMUSICOLOGY 
Ethnomusicology’s roots can be traced back to the 1880s and 1890s when 
activity in the field began with studies conducted primarily in the United States 
and Germany. In Germany, scholars focused their efforts on musical sound and 
structure, treating sound as isolated or a system operating per its own internal 
rules. Additionally, the German school explored the origins of music through a 
framework of classic social evolution, which was popular at the time. Meanwhile 
in the United States, an alternative approach arose almost in reaction to the 
German social evolutionary approach. In the United States, emphasis was 
placed less on the structural components of sound and music and more on the 
cultural role of music and its function within the larger context of social and 
cultural organization of man.43 Meanwhile, the behavioral understanding of man 
at the time was limited primarily to Western and Far Eastern cultures, and 
anthropology offered an opportunity to expand comparative analysis of human 
behaviors beyond Europe and eastern Asia. Early ethnomusicologists adopted 
similar focus, and hence an emphasis on music within non-Western cultures 
arose.44  
This thesis proposes that the methods of inquiry and frameworks of 
analysis used by ethnomusicologists can be directly and indirectly applied to 
counterterrorism analysis and regional security studies. A notable trend in early 
ethnomusicology literature is a focus on understanding why ethnomusicologists 
study music in the context of broader human culture, and what defines 
ethnomusicology as a social science versus a humanity, or at the very least a 
unique combination of both. Ethnomusicologist Bruno Nettl referred to this 
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introspection within the new discipline as the “harmless drudge,” and touched 
upon it in his book, The Study of Ethnomusicology: Thirty-One Issues and 
Concepts. 
Alan Merriam began his innovative ethnography of Flathead music 
thus: “All people, in no matter what culture, must be able to place 
their music firmly in the context of the totality of their beliefs, 
experiences, and activities, for without such ties, music cannot 
exist” (1967a: 3). Charles Seeger (1977: 217) wrote in 1946 that 
the ultimate purposes of musicology are “the advancement of 
knowledge of and about music [and] of the place and function of 
music in human culture.” John Blacking ended his most influential 
book thus: “In a world such as ours … it is necessary to understand 
why a madrigal by Gesualdo or a Bach Passion, a sitar melody 
from India or a song from Africa … a Cantonese opera, or a 
symphony by Mozart, Beethoven or Mahler, may be profoundly 
necessary for human survival” (1973:116). Three different but 
equally emphatic ways of expressing the same principle: for 
understanding music, the significance of its relationship to the rest 
of culture is paramount.45 
Written in 1964, when the then relatively new field of combined 
anthropology and musicology was really coming into its own, Alan P. Merriam’s 
The Anthropology of Music provides a succinct analysis of the ethnomusicology 
discipline. Merriam’s writing attempts to define the discipline and outline the 
methods of inquiry available to ethnomusicologists. It is punctuated by relevant 
examples of his own findings and those of other ethnomusicology scholars, like 
this 1960 passage from William G. Haaq highlighting the relationship between 
culture and art, a concept that is fundamental to this research. 
 
Artists are relentlessly grasped by the strongest but subtlest force 
that moves the world, that is, cultural determinism. Every change in 
the artistic taste of the times is engendered and nourished in a 
realm beyond the “minds” of artists… That place, of course, is the 
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culture—the normative, stylistic, consistent behavior of which the 
artist is a participant and a partaker.46  
 In his literature, Merriam walks readers through the fundamental concepts 
and responsibilities of ethnomusicology and its origins as a merger between the 
fields of musicology and anthropology. Further, he proposes a theoretical 
framework based on the relationship between concepts, behavior, and music, 
and the learning feedback that occurs among these elements.  
B. A THEORETICAL RESEARCH MODEL FOR ETHNOMUSICOLOGY AS 
IT RELATES TO COUNTERTERRORISM 
In his 1964 work “The Anthropology of Music,” ethnomusicologist Alan 
Merriam set out to propose a theoretical model for ethnomusicology research. In 
order to develop this model, Merriam, like many of his contemporaries, devotes a 
significant portion of his writing to analyzing ethnomusicology as a discipline and 
understanding why ethnomusicologists do what they do. He does this by distilling 
his analysis down to a framework of methodology, practice, and responsibilities.  
Merriam begins by identifying three stages of ethnomusicology 
methodology: data collection, data analysis, and application of results. By 
identifying these stages, Merriam is attempting early on to establish 
ethnomusicology research methods founded in rigor rather than intuition and 
define ethnomusicology’s role as a bridge between anthropology and 
musicology, or the humanities and social sciences, based on defined scientific 
research methodology.  
His analysis of ethnomusicology and the distinction between the humanities 
(the study of culture made by humans) and the social sciences (the study of how 
humans live together) can inform modern counterterrorism research in two ways. 
 
The ultimate interest of man is man himself, and music is part of 
what he does and part of what he studies about himself. But equally 
important is the fact that music is also human behavior, and the 
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ethnomusicologist shares both with the social sciences and the 
humanities the search for an understanding of why men behave as 
they do.47 
First, it can be applied comparatively as a standard to which 
counterterrorism research might aspire as a “young” academic field. Second, it 
can be applied directly as ethnomusicological research can be scientifically 
applied to a region through data collection, analysis, and application, to identify 
and address the potential for violent extremism. This research focuses on the 
latter. 
Data collection, according to Merriam, involves the complex relation of 
theory to method, research design, methodology, and technique, not unlike other 
disciplines more commonly regarded as established academically rigorous 
disciplines. The subsequent analysis of the collected data involves two kinds of 
analysis for the ethnomusicologist. First, the ethnographic and ethnologic materials 
must be collated to establish the practices, concepts, and behaviors present as 
they relate to the hypotheses set forth in the research problem. Second, the actual 
musical sound materials collected must be subjected to technical laboratory 
analysis and structural analysis. Finally, having collected and analyzed data 
pertinent to an established research problem, the ethnomusicologist must apply 
the results of the analysis to relevant problems. As in other disciplines, the 
researcher seeks to apply the results of his/her research to ethnomusicology 
specifically, but more broadly to the social sciences and the humanities. What sets 
ethnomusicology apart in the application stage, according to Merriam, is the 
necessity to join two data types, the anthropological and the musicological, to 
effectively apply the research to relevant problems.48  
Merriam goes on to assert that since a discipline can be defined in terms 
of what its practitioners do, then in turn the actions of a discipline’s practitioners 
can inform the specific aims and purposes of the discipline, or “why” its 
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practitioners do what they do. To this end he proposes four approaches or 
actions demonstrated by ethnomusicologists that help define the overall purpose 
of the ethnomusicology field. First, according to Merriam, ethnomusicologists 
defend and promote non-Western music. This defensive or protective approach 
toward non-Western culture, which ethnomusicology shares with anthropology, 
serves to counter the ethnocentric idea that the music of other cultures is less 
worthy of research or analysis. Per Merriam, “ethnocentrism must be attacked 
wherever it is found.”49 Is it not then possible to draw a corollary to modern 
counterterrorism research, in which analysts seek to understand the grievances 
of foreign or non-Western populations and must therefore attack ethnocentricity 
in their approaches in order to be successful? 
A second proposed purpose of ethnomusicology is the effort to record or 
study disappearing “folk” music before it is gone. While a direct analogy cannot 
necessarily be identified with counterterrorism research, the implied sense of a 
“race against time” is certainly a facet of both fields. On the one hand, 
ethnomusicologists are racing to capture data that they fear may be temporary in 
nature; on the other hand, counterterrorism research is driven largely by a desire 
to gain understanding of a situation quickly enough to identify and eliminate an 
impending threat. 
The third proposed purpose, which is most directly applicable to this 
research, is that ethnomusicologists strive to understand music as a means of 
communication that can be leveraged to advance understanding and 
communication between communities or cultures. Taking. Taking what appears 
to be an ominously Cold War approach to this effort to understand 
communication, Mantle Hood predicted: 
In the latter half of the Twentieth Century it may well be that the 
very existence of man depends on the accuracy of his 
communications. Communication among people is a two-way 
street: speaking and listening, informing and being informed, 
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constructively evaluating and welcoming constructive criticism. 
Communication is accurate to the extent that it is founded on a sure 
knowledge of the man with whom we would hold intercourse.50 
This notion that truly understanding the sender of a message is 
instrumental to understanding the message itself is fundamental to 
counterterrorism and regional security studies and implies that in order to really 
identify, understand, and address the grievances expressed by populations at 
risk to radicalization, we must achieve an understanding of, and empathy with, 
that population. 
Ethnomusicologists are careful to acknowledge that although certain 
musical relationships such as the octave or the fifth are universally regarded as 
stable focal tones across cultures, music is not in fact a “universal language.” 
Instead, the communicative properties of music are often only effective within a 
given “music community” and in many cases, a cross-cultural diversity of music 
styles tends to stress barriers rather than communicability between communities. 
An experiment conducted by Robert Morey in 1940, in which he presented 
Western classical pieces considered by Western audiences to express fear, 
reverence, rage, and love to native West Africans, demonstrated that the emotive 
messaging of music tends to be lost in translation across cultural divides.51 To 
that end, ethnomusicologists seek to increase understanding of how 
communication through music functions within specific music communities. This 
research explores whether the same holds true for messaging of grievances 
across intergroup cultural divides, and whether music, or a better understanding 
of music, may provide a lens through which analysts can better identify and 
address the grievances of groups or individuals that may be vulnerable to 
radicalization. Armed with this understanding of the limitations of communicating 
with music across intergroup cultural divides, counterterrorism practitioners might 
reconsider somewhat misguided attempts to counter extremist messaging 
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through music with attempts at “authentic” counter-messaging via that medium. 
This will be visited again as part of the discussion on music and its ability to 
promote violent extremism. 
Finally, Merriam points to a “catholicity” or universality to the study of 
music, which is to say, music can mean many things to many people, and 
similarly the individual drive to study the music of other cultures can vary from 
researcher to researcher.52 He cites Bruno Nettl, “In summary, then, to all people 
interested in music and to all interested in primitive culture, the study of this 
music offers new fields for exploration and a wider range for reflection.”53 In this 
sense, the application of ethnomusicology recommended in this thesis could be 
considered just an extension of the range of reflection proposed by Nettl and his 
contemporaries over 60 years ago. 
Alternatively, on his path toward a theoretical model for ethnomusicology, 
Merriam further identifies three responsibilities of the ethnomusicologist: the 
technical study of music to include structure, sound, etc., the study of human 
behavior and social behavior, and the responsibility to inform other fields of 
research. 
In short, the problems of ethnomusicology are neither exclusively 
technical nor exclusively behavioral. Nor is ethnomusicology an 
isolated discipline concerned only with esoterica which cannot be 
understood by any save those who study it. Rather, it seeks to 
combine two kinds of study and to contribute the results of its 
research to the solution of a broad spectrum of problems both in 
the humanities and in the social sciences.54 
So, having defined ethnomusicology in terms of its methodology, 
objectives, practices, and responsibilities, Merriam ultimately synthesizes these 
concepts into a concise theoretical research model involving study on “three 
analytic levels—conceptualization about music, behavior in relation to music, and 
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music as sound itself. The first and third levels are connected to represent the 
constantly changing, dynamic nature exhibited by all music systems.55  
 
Figure 2.  Ethnomusicology Theoretical Research Model 
The third level, the music itself, is fairly straightforward, and while the 
study of the structure, patterns, etc., of musical sound is the primary focus of 
musicologists the world over, it does not contribute significantly to this research, 
except of course, in that the music must be regarded as a product of the 
behaviors that create it. At the behavioral level, Merriam begins to identify 
concepts in his theoretical model that might be applied to modern regional 
security studies. Specifically, he identifies three major kinds of behavior: physical, 
social, and verbal. Physical behavior can be considered both the physical 
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behavior required to produce sound as well as the physical response of an 
individual to the sound. Social behavior as well can be subdivided into two 
categories: the social behavior of the musician as an individual creating music 
and of the non-musician as an individual responding to the music at a music 
event or in another social context.56 This level of behavioral analysis becomes 
potentially relevant to security studies by providing insight into norms or shifts in 
musical behavior of the region that might indicate a change in the conceptual 
inputs that may be affecting the musical styles or narratives of the region. The 
shifts in musical style could then provide an indicator of a change in the socio-
cultural dynamics within the region.  
The third conceptual level of Merriam’s framework focuses specifically on 
the notion of musical concepts as they pertain to the creation of music. For the 
purpose of this research, this conceptual analysis can be reasonably expanded 
to include the social concepts that no doubt influence the messaging of a region’s 
musical expression and the response of the members of a society to the music. 
This final notion of a response to the music, or feedback from level one of the 
model to level three of the model, is perhaps the most significant element of 
Merriam’s model. In short, the musical product is judged by both listener and 
performer, and if the response is positive, the behavioral and conceptual 
elements will be reinforced within the music system. Alternatively, if the music is 
judged negatively or the intended response is not achieved, the behavioral and 
conceptual elements of the music system will be altered until the intended 
outcome is realized. “Thus, there is a constant feedback from the product to the 
concepts about music, and this is what accounts both for change and stability in 
a music system. The feedback, of course, represents the learning process both 
for the musician and for the non-musician, and it is continual.”57 
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In summary, is it possible that Merriam’s theoretic model for 
ethnomusicology could be applied indirectly to regional security studies as a 
conceptual model to understand what violent extremists do (the “music”), how 
they do what they do (the “behavior”), and why they do what they do (the 
“concept”)? Is it also possible, then, to apply this ethnomusicology model directly 
to a region of interest and work it backward starting with a deep understanding of 
the music of the region, to then understand the individual and social behavior 
creating that music, and finally gain a more nuanced understanding of the 
concepts driving the musical creation in the region as it relates to expressing 
potential social grievances that might give rise to violent extremism? To answer 
these questions, one must first consider the psychological role music can play in 
promoting violent extremism and in influencing the psychology of intergroup 
relationships. 
C. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MUSIC 
The first step—especially for young people with energy and drive 
and talent, but not money—the first step to controlling your world is 
to control your culture. To model and demonstrate the kind of world 
you demand to live in. To write the books. Make the music. Shoot 
the films. Paint the art.  
 ―Chuck Palahniuk58 
The more researchers study the effects of music on society, culture, 
human spirit, and even the human brain itself, the more the research proves what 
we perhaps knew all along: music and sound have an inextricable psychological 
connection to humanity and can significantly influence human attitudes and 
behaviors.59 The psychological effects of music, once understood, can 
potentially be used to better appreciate the psychosocial landscape of a 
population and perhaps influence intergroup relationships within that population 
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to reduce the potential for violent extremism. First, this paper will discuss the 
documented psychological effects of music, from the physiological effects on the 
brain to the behavioral and attitudinal influences on individuals to its ability to 
represent and influence group cultural dynamics. Second, this paper will explore 
the role of music in intergroup relationships through the psychological themes of 
irrationality, materialism, identity, and subjective justice.60 Finally, as it pertains 
to violent extremism and radicalization, we explore the use of music to forge 
identity, air grievances, commemorate heroes and events, and to label and 
dehumanize enemies. This paper proposes that through music, outsiders of a 
group can better understand the psychological motives of the group, and 
members within the group can influence the psychology to improve intergroup 
relationships and prevent potential conflict. Ideally, the knowledge gained 
through this analysis can be used to determine how to best leverage the 
influence of music to counter extremism across the entire engagement spectrum, 
from tracking and targeting bad actors to constructively engaging at-risk 
communities to prevent radicalization and promote stability. 
a. Psychological Impact of Music  
Ethnomusicologists have long understood the value of music as a window 
into the soul of a community or culture. The entire progression within the 
academic field from mere comparative musicology to ethnomusicology 
demonstrates the understanding over time, that to truly understand the music, 
you must understand the culture, and vice-versa.61 Through the study of music, 
Ethnomusicologists pursue seemingly contradictive objectives, according to 
Bruno Nettl. “They search for universals, hoping to generalize intelligently about 
the way in which the world’s cultures construct, use, conceive of music,” and 
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“they try to understand human music in the context of human culture as a unitary 
phenomenon.”62 
b. Analyzing Music and Imagery According to the Psychological 
Themes of Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations 
Music provides researchers access to the collective psychology of 
intergroup relationships and multiculturalism in two ways. First, analysis of the 
music being produced by a society reflects the current and historical 
psychological landscape or cultural identity of that society and its members. 
Second, in that music has a significant impact on the psychology of individuals as 
well as groups, music can serve as a force to shape the psychological path of a 
group and how it interacts with other groups moving forward. Therefore, by using 
a framework of psychological limitations to intergroup organizations, one can 
analyze the music and associated imagery being created by groups within a 
multicultural society to learn about the intergroup relationships within the society. 
The psychological themes presented by Dr. Fathali Moghaddam in 
Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations: Implications for Democracy in Global 
Context provide an effective framework for analyzing the potential impacts of 
music in regions like the Sahel. These four intergroup psychological themes 
include irrationality, materialism, identity, and subjective justice. 
Irrationality—The irrationalist perspective presents the idea that behavior 
between groups is shaped by unconscious motives, desires, fears, etc.63 
Oftentimes, humans will apply false rational explanations to justify conflict 
between groups based on these unconscious motives. Simply put, humans are 
quick to rationalize irrational actions.64 Moghaddam points out that “people come 
to see themselves as members of groups that are in fundamental respects 
different from other groups, but actually in many cases the intergroup differences 
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are minor. This narcissism of minor differences involves the construction of 
differences even when objectively there are none.”65 Music can serve as a useful 
tool to propagate this often dangerous irrationality. By portraying irrational ideas 
through the accepted medium of music, a group can mobilize its members 
toward otherwise irrational actions. Irrational ideas may be “received less 
critically by the target audience when set to music because it engages them on a 
more emotional level.”66 A stark example of this exists in the music of Simon 
Bikindi, the Rwandan Hutu singer whose song “I Hate These Hutus” called for the 
censure of moderate Hutus or those who tolerated Tutsis. This music was 
broadcast during the 1994 genocide alongside messages calling for the hunting 
down and killing of Tutsis.67 Fortunately, for the same reasons that music can 
effectively promote irrational ideas, it can also effectively promote more rational 
intergroup dialogue. Mark LeVine’s book Heavy Metal Islam provides accounts of 
music as a force to promote tolerance, reconciliation, and positive intergroup 
exchanges.68 An awareness of the existence of this psychological irrationality 
and the ability to potentially detect and counter its influence through music may 
facilitate more productive and peaceful intergroup relations, particularly in 
populations at risk to radicalization and violent extremism. 
Materialism—The materialist theories of intergroup relationships explore 
the perceived material inequalities between groups. Therefore, the tendency of 
groups toward either sharing or competing for limited group resources can 
likewise drive a tendency toward peace or conflict, respectively.69 In considering 
materialist theories, we consider the shared resources of the group. However, as 
the importance of materialism and individual wealth becomes more prominent in 
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developing nations, one can expect a corollary rise in materialist intergroup 
psychological influences. Furthermore, the rise of the digital age has spawned a 
vibrant digital youth culture in the cities and countryside of Mali, where youth are 
sharing music and digital imagery they have created online. Among other things, 
a strong hip-hop influence can be seen as the Western African culture meets the 
music and culture of the West. With it, hip-hop brings the same themes of 
individual and group materialism that define its image in the West. An analysis of 
open-source imagery found on the Facebook pages of Mali youth reveals 
hundreds of images like those in Figure 3, created and shared on computers and 
cell phones. Images that, like the musical culture they represent, glorify this 
sense of individual materialism. Here we see intergroup contact on the macro 
level, between East and West, potentially influencing intergroup materialist 
values on a micro or individual level. Likewise, this promotion of individual 
materialist values through music and culture at the individual level can only serve 
to amplify the effects of materialist psychological issues at the intergroup level. 
 
Figure 3.  Mali Youth Culture Imagery70 
Identity—Identity theories of intergroup exchanges focus on how 
individuals view themselves within the group and the groups they belong to 
compared to those to which they do not belong.71 Identity theories relate to 
intergroup relationships in that humans will consistently turn to in-group/out-
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group membership to answer the question, “What sort of person am I?”72 Dr. 
Moghaddam cites three reasons for the recent focus on identity as it pertains to 
intergroup dynamics. The first is globalization: the increased movement of people 
and goods across the globe has driven a corresponding increase of interaction 
between people from diverse groups, who previously would not have 
interacted.73 The second is the proliferation of mass media. With the advent of 
television and even more so, the internet, groups are exposed to foreign ideals 
and norms in their own living rooms. With this exposure come new questions 
about one’s own identity and values. As we have shown in the previous section 
on materialist views, the direct influence of Western hip-hop culture on Malian 
youth is reflected in the music and imagery they create and post online. Likewise, 
those images and songs are accessed and consumed by other foreign groups, 
and the result is a robust collaborative multiculturalism on the internet. The third 
and final reason for the resurgent focus on identity is the paradoxical rise in 
mobilization of minorities. Despite the abovementioned globalization and mass 
media phenomena, ethnic allegiances have not diminished with modernization.74 
Here again, music and youth culture play a potential role in this resistance to 
ethnic dilution in the face of increased globalization. Especially among 
adolescents, music is pivotal in establishing and maintaining social identity and 
group boundaries.75 
Subjective justice—subjective justice theories consider the subjective 
perceptions of fairness between and within groups, regardless of the actual 
presence of objective justice or injustices. Subjective justice theory proposes that 
individual and group psychological tendencies toward seeing the world as just 
can facilitate the sustainment of significant injustices.76 The different subjective 
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justice theories discussed by Moghaddam, such as just-world theory, equity 
theory, and relative deprivation theory, all have two things in common: their 
reliance on relatives versus absolutes and the importance of individual and group 
perceptions of justice.77 Importantly, this perception of relative deprivation is 
categorized into two types: egoistic deprivation and fraternalistic deprivation, 
where the former is a feeling of deprivation by the individual relative to the rest of 
the group and the latter is a feeling of deprivation of a group relative to other 
groups.78 In the example of Mali and recent intergroup conflict there, the 
subjective justice theory certainly plays a critical role. Historically, the Tauregs in 
the desert region of northern Mali have perceived fraternalistic deprivation that 
has been fueled by underrepresentation in the central government of Mali and a 
longstanding desire for an independent Taureg state, referred to by Tauregs as 
Azawad and spanning the Sahel regions of Mauritania, Mali, and Niger. This 
combined with a sense of fraternalistic deprivation among the southern Bambara 
population of Mali, who felt generally dissatisfied with the ineffective democracy 
within Bamako, created a unique environment in which a sequence of events led 
to a quick decline into harsh Sharia law in the north following a military coup in 
the south.79 The musical behaviors associated with subjective theory as they 
pertained to the situation in Mali will be discussed in the following section. 
D. MUSIC IN INTERGROUP DYNAMICS 
Having touched briefly on the psychological theories of intergroup 
relationships, one must consider the ways in which music is commonly used to 
influence individual and group psychology and how those uses relate back to the 
abovementioned psychological themes. According to research done by Dr. 
Anthony Lemieux, the four primary ways in which music can be used by violent 
extremist groups are as follows: 1) to label and dehumanize enemies, 2) to air 
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grievances, 3) to commemorate heroes or events, and 4) and to forge identities. 
Interestingly, each of the four uses for music in violent extremism can be 
correlated with at least one of the four psychosocial theories of intergroup 
relationships set forth by Dr. Moghaddam. 
Forging identities—According to Dr. Lemieux’s research, “musical 
preferences can serve as markers of an individual’s social identities, fulfilling a 
fundamental need to belong to a group while simultaneously having a core 
aspect of his or her personal identity differentiate this individual from other group 
members.”80 In other words, behavioral relationships between groups or 
individuals and the music they create or listen to plays a significant role in how 
those groups or individuals identify themselves. Ethnomusicology research 
supports the ideas of distinct musical grouping, in that ethnomusicologists have 
long disparaged the notion of music as a “universal language.” Instead, research 
has shown that distinct musical communities exist just as there exist speech 
communities, and often musical “dialects” between groups are mutually 
unintelligible.81 This anthropological musical divergence combined with 
Lemieux’s notion of musical social identity theory, indicates that music’s ability to 
forge identities is powerful and ties directly to the psychological identity theory of 
multicultural or intergroup relationship. 
Airing grievances—Additionally, Dr. Lemieux proposes that music is a 
powerful mechanism within a group for airing grievances through the use of 
words and images that inform the group to the problems they face and that 
promote a sense of shared struggle.82 Examples of the use of music to air 
grievances are evident in jihadi-themed music as well as the music of white 
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supremacists.83 In both instances, these examples draw upon the psychological 
themes of subjective justice as they relate the one group’s struggle against 
perceived injustices at the hands of another group. He provides an outstanding 
example in the compositions of Bilal Ben Aboud, whose lyrics focus on themes of 
deprivation, both egoistic and fraternalistic, such as having no job despite being 
educated and abusive treatment by authorities at a border checkpoint.84 Through 
analysis of the degree to which a population’s music addresses the grievances of 
the group, researchers can hope to better identify the subjective injustices that 
the groups perceive and predict the extent to which that group might act upon 
those perceived injustices. The research of mid-20th century ethnomusicologist 
Hugh Tracy supports Lemieux’s claim. In his 1954 book The Social Role of 
African Music, Tracy notes in regard to the African Chopi that “You can say 
publicly in songs what you cannot say privately to a man’s face, and so this is 
one of the ways African society takes to maintain a spiritual healthy 
community.”85 Knowledge of this cultural facet can assist critical security studies 
analysts in assessing underlying potential for radicalization or violent extremism 
within a population. 
Commemorating heroes and events—Lemieux cites several examples 
of the use of music as a narrative to commemorate significant events or people 
of an organization’s history. White supremacists, for example, conduct annual 
live performances of music celebrating the members of the Order, an Aryan 
terrorist group, and mourning the murder of its founder by federal authorities.86 In 
Mali, following the military coup of 2012, several Bamako rappers formed an 
activist group called Les Sofas de la Republique in honor of the historic Berber 
sofa warriors. The use of music in this manner to identify and promote 
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organizational heritage assists in building unit cohesion and therefore has 
implications on the psychological theories of social identity and subjective justice 
in intergroup relations. 
Label and dehumanize enemies—Just as music can be used to express 
ideas that might otherwise be impossible to express publicly or face-to-face, so it 
can also be used to express socially unacceptable ideas such as the 
dehumanizing or de-legitimization of out-groups. According to Lemieux, this 
dehumanizing power of music can foster harsh, negative, and de-legitimizing 
images that can label out-groups in negative terms. Even if the music does not 
specifically call for or advocate for action against an enemy or out-group, the 
negative labels presented can be used by the listeners to validate or justify taking 
actions against a particular enemy.87 Further, this notion of music as a tool to 
dehumanize an out-group relates directly to the intergroup social theories of 
irrationality and identity theory outlined earlier in this discussion. The messaging 
of a group through music that their enemies are less than human (identity 
theory), combined with messaging that violence toward that group is therefore 
justified (irrationality), presents a volatile and powerful messaging tool that violent 
extremists are all too eager to employ toward achieving their objectives. 
Having established the relationship between the psychology of intergroup 
relationships and the psychological role of music on individuals and groups, the 
regional security analyst must then consider how the knowledge gained from this 
relationship can be practically applied to countering violent extremism and 
engaging vulnerable communities within the larger population. By understanding 
the psychological theories of intergroup dynamics (irrationality, materialism, 
social identity, and subjective justice) and how they can be related to the 
psychological functions of music in extremism (airing grievances, forging 
identities, commemorating heroes, and dehumanizing enemies), critical security 
studies academics can hope to better understand why humans resort to violent 
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extremism and how best to combat, or even better, prevent this extremism. As 
ethnomusicologist study music to understand cultures, and critical security 
studies researchers study cultures to understand extremism, the two fields can 
inform each other through interdisciplinary collaboration. 
E. COMMUNICATION THEORY AND NETWORK CONVERGENCE IN 
SAHEL 
Finally, having considered principles of ethnomusicology and the 
psychology of music, it is essential to understand the principles of network 
convergence and communication theory and how they uniquely apply to the 
African Sahel. In “Communications for Isolated and Marginalized Groups 
Blending the Old and the New,” Silvia Balit proposes that “communication and 
culture are closely interwoven. Communication is a product of culture and culture 
determines the code, structure, meaning and context of the communication that 
takes place.”88 In the Sahel, because the cultural histories are thousands of 
years old, effective communication depends largely upon consideration for the 
cultures present within the communities. Whereas a Western communicator is 
familiar with modern technology for communication, it cannot be assumed that 
impoverished regions of Africa can rely on similar technologies, or that when 
available they will be used in the same manner as they are used in the West.89 
Everett Rogers, the creator of the diffusion of innovations theory defined 
communication as “the process in which participants create and share 
information with one another to reach a mutual understanding.”90 Systems of 
communication include interpersonal communication (direct communication 
between people), telecommunication (communication at a distance by electronic 
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methods), and mass communication (communication to a large audience via 
mass media).91 According to a 2007 report conducted by the University of 
Nebraska’s Global Innovation and Strategy Center, titled Communications 
Channels in the Sahel Using Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad as a Case Study, 
Africa is still the poorest continent in the world, but due to expanded information 
communications technologies, Africans have an increased awareness of their 
situation, which can foster disenchantment, despair, and resentment.92 Further, 
the report acknowledges that stability in the Sahel is currently threatened by 
factors including, but not limited to, remoteness, porous borders, proximity to 
known terrorist groups, significant marginalized or disenfranchised populations, 
and exclusion from political processes. These assessments provide further 
evidence of the complex intergroup psychological factors at play in the region: 
subjective justice, materialism, and identity. 
1. Two-Step Flow Model and Diffusion Innovations Theory 
Communications flow theories developed in the 1940s turn out to be 
surprisingly applicable models for both understanding communication flow in the 
modern digital social networking environment and analyzing the centuries-old 
nomadic communication systems of the Sahel. Perhaps they can provide a 
framework, then, for the unique situation developing in the Sahel, whereby 
increased penetration of digital communication technology is integrating with 
established cultural communication norms and a geographic environment that 
will remain hostile to the proliferation of digital technology for at least the 
foreseeable future. 
Early communication theorists considered mass-media communication 
flow to be a simple one-step process, known as the one-step flow model, in 
which the message was sent via mass-media sources and was wholly received 
by individuals upon first exposure to the media source. This is also referred two 
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as the hypodermic needle or magic gun theory, whereby the message is being 
“injected” directly to a passive audience. Examples of this communication 
method include propaganda efforts employed by the Nazis or even Orson Welles’ 
“War of the Worlds” broadcast.93 Quickly superseded by the two-step model in 
the 1940s, the magic gun theory is finding renewed applicability in social 
networking, where media outlets are able to use algorithms based on big data to 
target specific audiences directly through social media, achieving results similar 
to the one-step flow model.94 
Research in the 1940s showed that communication flowed more 
effectively and more often through a two-step flow model in which certain 
participants are opinion leaders who interpret media and put it into relevant 
context for the community. In the two-step model then, most participants are not 
directly influenced through mass media, but instead are influenced by opinion 
leaders with whom they engage.95 Figure 4 shows the two-step flow theory 
modeled through Twitter. Here, “opinion leaders” are able to leverage high 
numbers of connections or followers to amplify a desired message to a broader 
audience than could be reached through mass media alone. In a region like the 
Sahel where mass media efforts are constrained by geographic, technological, 
and cultural dynamics, this concept of opinion leaders both in social media and in 
traditional communication networks becomes critical to understanding regional 
communication paradigms. 
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Figure 4.  Two-Step Flow Model96 
The diffusion of innovation theory was popularized by Everett Rogers in 
the 1960s and borrows from traditional diffusion theory to build on the 
abovementioned communication models and proposes that diffusion is “the 
process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over 
time among the participants in a social system.”97 According to Rogers, diffusion 
includes four key elements: innovation, communication channels, time, and 
social systems, as outlined in Table 1.98 For the purpose of this research, new 
ideas or messages presented through music represent the innovations up for 
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consideration. By using diffusion of innovation theory as a framework for 
analyzing music innovation in the Sahel, researchers can hope to achieve two 
objectives. First by analyzing the diffusion of ideas and messaging through music 
as a “communication channel” and foundation of the “social system,” researchers 
can assess courses of action for effectively delivering messages to hard-to-reach 
populations in the Sahel. Second, by conducting a technical analysis of the 
diffusion of musical style innovations through an ethnomusicology lens, 
researchers can identify relationships within the social system that might not 
otherwise be evident. There will be more on this in the Chapter IV. 
Table 1. Diffusion of Innovation Elements99 
Element Definition 
Innovation 
Innovations are a broad category, relative to the current knowledge of 
the analyzed unit. Any idea, practice, or object that is perceived as 
new by an individual or other unit of adoption could be considered an 
innovation available for study.  
Communication 
channels 
Diffusion, by definition, takes place among people or organizations. 
Communication channels allow the transfer of information from one 
unit to the other. Communication patterns or capabilities must be 
established between parties as a minimum for diffusion to occur. 
Time The passage of time is necessary for innovations to be adopted; they are rarely adopted instantaneously.  
Social system 
The social system is the combination of external influences (mass 
media, organizational or governmental mandates) and internal 
influences (strong and weak social relationships, distance from opinion 
leaders). There are many roles in a social system, and their 
combination represents the total influences on a potential adopter.  
 
2. Network Convergence in the Sahel 
The harsh environment of the Sahara and nomadic heritage of its 
inhabitants present a sense of geography or place in the Sahel that does not 
exist anywhere else in the world. Because survival in the Sahel mandated a 
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dependence on a complex set of regional and trans-Saharan trade networks 
dating back centuries, geographic communities in the Sahel can be deceptive. In 
many instances what appear to be tight-knit localities, or villages, are in fact 
merely a convergence of several networks into a shared geographic node. 
Analogously, Horden and Purcell, in their work on the Mediterranean, refer to 
nodes of density in overlapping networks versus cities.100 Therefore, it is not 
unusual that the inhabitants of villages or nodes of density in the Sahel may have 
a stronger connectivity to other external nodes of their network, but at the same 
time rely on internal local relationships for logistical support and even survival. 
Judith Scheele unravels this dichotomy between containment and 
connectivity in the Sahel in her 2012, Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara: 
Regional Connectivity in the 20th Century. She notes that “intellectual and moral 
connectivity, and related problems of containment, are hence as crucial to the 
making of Saharan human ecologies as irrigation practices and regional patterns 
of exchange.”101 This sense of moral connectivity versus containment becomes 
key, as Scheele sites a constant struggle between the badiya, or wilderness, and 
the qariya. or village or settlement, and creates an emphasis on the moral 
connectivity within villages expressed in terms of tribal excellence or Islamic 
observance.102 Additionally, this network convergence includes licit as well as 
illicit networks and involves a complex interaction between regional and trans-
Saharan networks. Trans-Saharan trade relies on this regional infrastructure, and 
in all but exceptional cases such as international cocaine smuggling, for instance, 
any neat division between trans-Saharan and Saharan networks is misleading.  
Therefore, in the Sahel we find a unique infrastructure of networks 
converging at nodes of density-like villages, trading, posts or oases, where 
internal connectivity may not be as strong as external connectivity, but that may 
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have established norms for moral containment that may differ considerably from 
neighboring villages or nodes. Scheele’s assessment that these nodes or oases 
“appear as sites of investment and production, but also, and perhaps first and 
foremost, as storage and transshipment points, where goods were repackaged or 
resold, money changed hands, and one set of camels, guides, and necessary 
sociopolitical knowledge was replaced with another” remains relevant to today’s 
regional network connectivity. One cannot expect to successfully apply the 
communication flow theories outlined previously without a thorough 
understanding of the “sociopolitical” turnover resident at each node of regional 
networks in the Sahel. 
3. Cell Phones in the Sahel—Radio Con-Con 2.0 
The rapid proliferation of cell phones into the Sahel over the last decade 
presents opportunities for regional security analysts and violent extremists alike. 
Failing to recognize, however, that cell phones in the Sahel are not being used 
the way they are in London or New York, could prove a fatal flaw in efforts to 
leverage the technology to promote stability or counter extremist messaging. As 
discussed earlier, communication channels and social system are key elements 
of a diffusion flow model. In the Sahel, existing centuries-old communication 
channels combined with traditional communications paradigms within the social 
system present a landscape for the use of cell phone technology that might 
surprise the average Western observer. Let us consider these communication 
channels and social implications. 
Although modern communication systems are few and concentrated within 
urban areas in the Sahel, communication flow is widespread due to the flow of 
information from urban to rural areas and among villages via the connectivity of 
regional networks discussed earlier. The Malians refer to this peer-to-peer flow 
along lines of transportation “radio con-con” and their word-of-mouth 
communication method is much more reliable that the Western game of 
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“telephone,” due to the traditional nature of the custom.103 This radio con-con 
system developed out of necessity and in the absence of big media technologies 
such as radio or television. Now this entrenched system shapes the way 
technology is employed in the region, and any attempt to communicate in the 
region without leveraging traditional systems such as radio con-con will be limited 
at best. 
According to the aforementioned 2007 University of Nebraska report, 
Communications Channels in the Sahel, almost 900,000 cell phones were in use 
in Mali in 2007.104 As shown in Table 2, that number increased to 14.6M in 2012, 
representing a jump from 7% to 88% of all Malians owning a cell phone.105 
Table 2. Mobile Phone Usage in Mali106 






2007 11.7M 75,000 869,600 7% 
2012 16.5M 112,000 14.6M 88% 
 
Based on these numbers, one might assume that communications 
technology in the Sahel has caught up to the West, and that the majority of 
Malians have access to the internet, but this is not the case. According to a 
report released by the Pew Research Center in 2015, the majority of mobile 
phone users in the seven sub-Saharan nations studied are using their devices for 
text messaging and taking photos and videos, and very few are using them to 
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access mobile internet or social media.107 It is likely that this trend is more 
drastic in Saharan regions. In some instances, these mobile devices are being 
used to enhance or amplify the Malian radio con-con system by literally serving 
as peer-to-peer sharing devices using Bluetooth technology between cell 
phones. According to ethnomusicologist Christopher Kirkley, the traditional and 
previously ubiquitous mixtape market is being replaced by lo-fi recordings made 
with cell phones in dusty rooms from Bamako to Gao, and are then being 
exchanged between friends and musicians across Mali and in some cases 
across West Africa.  
Little by little people are getting more internet access, but at the 
time music was traveling around literally by peer-to-peer transfers: 
Someone would have a song on their phone, take it to another 
phone, send it. That person would travel on a bus to another town 
and send it to their friends there. I’ve dropped off music in Niger 
and found that same song in Mauritania. It had made its way 1000 
kilometers.108 
Here we see that while cell phone ownership is surging in Africa, access 
to the internet is not necessarily keeping pace. Due to lack of infrastructure and 
the high cost of accessing broadband, Sahelians are not, as one might assume, 
using their mobile phones to access the internet. Instead, they are using them 
primarily for text messaging and video, photo, and music recording and sharing. 
According to the same Pew Research study, 80% of Africans use their phones 
for text messaging and 53% use them for taking photo or video. All other uses 
polled below 30% median across those interviewed. Additionally, the study found 
that, unlike the West, only 15% of Africans owned smartphones compared to 
64% in the United States.109 This reliance on mobile phones not connected to 
the internet to relay information and media across networks in the Sahel presents 
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a unique opportunity for researchers and analysts, but the window of opportunity 
for analysis may not remain open for very long, as access to broadband 
eventually permeates the region. 
Once the data isn’t transferred anymore, then it does disappear, 
due to size constraints on cellphones and the fact that it’s not being 
archived, in particular with the rebellion, I think that the really 
important story of what’s been happening in northern Mali does 
exist on cellphone medium. And we’ll see what happens. 
 —Christopher Kirkley110 
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IV. SYNTHESIS—MERGING CONCEPTS  
The preceding pages covered several frameworks borrowed from a 
disparate range of disciplines: a theoretical research model for ethnomusicology, 
the psychology of intergroup relationships, the psychology of music and violent 
extremism, diffusion of innovations theory, two-step theory, and network 
convergence theory. Ethnomusicology has been proposed as a useful but 
underleveraged tool available to regional security analysts that can provide 
insight into general cultural norms of a region while also providing specific insight 
into extremist messaging within the region. Alan Merriam’s framework for 
ethnomusicology research outlined the cyclical relationship between the 
concepts, behavior, and music in a musical community. Additionally, he identified 
technical, academic, and behavioral responsibilities of the ethnomusicologist. 
The multidisciplinary approach proposed below borrows Alan P. Merriam’s 
“responsibilities” for ethnomusicology as a framework for engaging violent 
extremism through music. According to Merriam, the ethnomusicologist 
maintains three responsibilities in the approach to his studies: a technical 
responsibility to understand the components of sound and music, an academic 
responsibility to inform other forms of academic research, and finally a social or 
behavioral responsibility to understand the role of music in cultural or social 
behavior.111 Adapting a similar framework of responsibilities, this research 
proposes three ways in which researchers can leverage ethnomusicology to 
understand a population at risk: targeting/tracking (technical), achieving 
understanding relevant to other disciplines or a designated culture (academic), 
and cultural engagement through music (social). Said another way, 
ethnomusicology can serve as a map, a lens, or a bridge, respectively as 
represented in Figure 5. While these responsibilities or functions overlap and 
inform one another, they can also be arranged in order across the spectrum of 
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engaging extremism from directly targeting/tracking bad actors and illicit 
networks (technical) on the one extreme to informed engagement and citizen 
diplomacy (social/behavioral) on the other. 
 
Figure 5.  Interdisciplinary Approach Model 
Figure 5 represents a visual depiction of the proposed framework aligning 
the three ethnomusicological “responsibilities” or lines of effort for countering 
violent extremism along a spectrum from targeting bad actors on one end to 
community engagement on the other. First, I propose that knowledge on how 
extremists use music and social media to influence the psychology of the group 
as well as the ability to track specific digital instances of music or art can be 
technically applied to identify and “map” networks of bad actors and then find, fix, 
and target those bad actors. Second, knowledge of a society’s musical history 
and culture can be used as a “lens” to decipher complex intergroup relations 
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within a population, and thus can be applied academically to inform other fields of 
study on that population or help better understand the cultural geography of the 
population. Finally, and most importantly, an in-depth understanding of the 
musical landscape of a society can help identify common ground or “bridge,” by 
which a community can be engaged by citizens and governments to promote 
stability and reduce risk of radicalization. 
The following sections will consider each of these responsibilities 
separately, beginning with targeting and tracking bad actors through musical 
network analysis, then objective ethnomusicological analysis, and finally 
opportunities for cultural engagement and citizen diplomacy through music. 
Although engagement is covered last, this research suggests that engagement 
through music is one of the most effective and underleveraged tools available to 
policy makers, researchers, diplomats, and security analysts. Regardless of 
objectives or desired approach, this research recommends that those intending 
to employ this framework for analysis should begin at the center of the spectrum 
to gain full understanding of the musical community of a region through 
ethnomusicological analysis, before then attempting to move left or right on the 
spectrum in order to target or engage regional actors. 
A. FOLLOW THE MUSIC: USING DIGITAL MUSIC TO TRACK AND 
TARGET BAD ACTORS AND NETWORKS 
What role, if any, does music play in promoting violent extremism in 
northern Africa? If it does play a role, how can we then categorize music in order 
to model how music physically spreads through a population? The ability to 
categorize the massive amounts of digital media coming out of northern Africa is 
crucial to measuring the degree to which modern African youth culture might be 
susceptible to the spread of extremist ideas via music and digital imagery. By 
building and applying a matrix system to categorize digital samples, I hope to 
determine 1) whether the vast music culture of northern Africa is in fact being 
used to spread extremist ideas, 2) how extremists are using the modern 
networks for music and media exchange, and 3) how best to exploit those 
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networks to either track and target extremists or counter extremism through 
positive messaging and engagement.  
The ideas presented within this section are conceptual in nature and 
intended to provide rudimentary models for further analysis. It is beyond the 
scope and technology available to this research to conduct a comprehensive 
analysis based on the models outlined herein. Overall, three models are 
presented that follow-on researchers might consider as starting points for 
collecting and analyzing data on a musical community or digital music network. 
For the purpose of this discussion, the medium of analysis will be expanded to 
include digital visual media that pervades the online musical communities and 
social media of modern youth culture in Mali. The first model provides a simple 
matrix that can be used to analyze and label media based on its mass appeal 
and message. The second model analyzes digital imagery associated with music 
and youth culture. The third model provides a potential technique for mapping 
cultural geography and physical networks through music. 
1. Binary Matrix Analysis of Media Message Versus Mass Appeal 
A matrix method is convenient for this qualitative dataset (music and 
images) because it provides a quantitative framework with which to separate 
elements of the data, categorize information by type, compare different types of 
information, compare similar pieces of information, and identify patterns within 
the data.112 The research recommends two matrices for music analysis. The first 
labels media based on two variables: extremity of message versus potential 
popularity. The second allows for the categorization of a large amount of musical 
and visual digital art according to pertinent psychological themes in order to 
identify trends in the messaging. 
Being able to rate a song based on the extremism or volatility of its 
message versus its overall musical quality or likeability allows researchers to 
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assess how much bearing a song’s message, quality, or both will have on its 
ability to promote a message within a group or outside a group. The matrix in 
Figure 6 allows for the quick and simple categorization of a song, video, or image 
into four generic groups.  
 
Figure 6.  Binary Matrix of Music Analysis 
By applying a binary value to its message and its quality, a song (for 
example) will be categorized as either appealing or not, and its message will be 
categorized as either positive-neutral or negative. This method is perhaps 
oversimplified but allows analysts or researchers to objectively group songs or 
media based on somewhat subjective analysis. For example, a category 1 song 
would be highly appealing but have no significant messaging, such as Daft 
Punk’s “Get Lucky.” Songs in categories 2 and 3 would share a common lack of 
musical appeal, but would either have an extreme message or not. American-
born jihadist, Omar Himmami’s “Blow by Blow” is an example of the latter. 
Finally, category 4 songs would be presumably the most dangerous or powerful, 
in that they may contain strong messaging combined with high mass appeal. LA 
rap group N.W.A.’s 1988 hit, “Fuck tha Police” is a powerful example of this. In 
an attempt to air valid grievances against police brutality and racial profiling of 
blacks by the LA Police Department, N.W.A. condoned the use of violence 
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against police in their lyrics. The song garnered FBI attention and significant 
backlash from law enforcement and others, but its message is arguably as 
powerful and relevant today as it was almost 30 years ago. “Fuck tha Police” is 
number 76 on the Rolling Stone list of the top 500 songs, ever.113 
The abovementioned matrix model is just one possible way in which music 
as a source of data can be objectively analyzed to identify patterns or trends. If 
desired, this categorization could be made more complex by rating songs on a 
scale of extremism and mass appeal from 0 to 10 and then plotting those points 
on a x-y axis scale similar to Figure 6. Taken alone, this categorization may not 
reveal much about the musical trends, but if compared against data showing how 
extremist media moves through a population, relationships may be revealed 
between what makes a song particularly effective at spreading ideas. Analysis of 
the messaging may reveal particular pockets of marginalization or 
disenfranchisement, and in this way even non-popular songs may be of import to 
the researcher. The surge in digitally manipulated photo art on Malian social 
media following the northern rebellion provides a robust database for further 
analysis of thematic trends in music or art. 
2. Psychological Matrix Analysis of Digital Imagery 
About the time that things were starting to heat up in northern Mali, 
Portland archivist and guerilla ethnomusicologist Christopher Kirkley was 
scouring the Mali desert searching for music to record or transfer for his 
compilations of “Music from Saharan Cellphones.”114 Along the way he 
discovered that Malian youth were using software on their computers and cell 
phones to create unique digital images that could then be shared from device to 
device or on social media. In many cases, these images were being created to 
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support local musicians who used the art for album covers or promotional media. 
Kirkley noted at the time that some of these images are an homage to American 
graphic artists Pen & Pixel, famous for their gaudy digital album covers for the 
American “Dirty South” rap movement in the late 1990s.115  
Figure 7 shows a Facebook cover image created by Prinsco Fatal Bass, a 
Malian digital artist. Figure 8 is an album cover created by Prinsco Fatal Bass for 
Gao rapper Pheno S. Note that for the album cover, Prinsco Fatal Bass recycles 
many of the same images from his Facebook image. Compare these to the Pen 
& Pixel album cover art for American rappers Wiz Khalifa and Ty Dolla $ign in 
Figure 9. Based on the similarities in artistic style, one would not be wrong to 
conclude that Western culture and style is likely influencing the digital media in 
Mali, but what about the themes involved. The Pen & Pixel image is indicative of 
common American hip-hop themes: wealth, drug use, objectification of women, 
etc. Then what are we to make of the extreme imagery in Prinsco Fatal Bass’ 
artwork: the 9/11 attacks, the Eiffel Tower being destroyed, attack helicopters, 
buildings on fire? What is happening here? Are these the messaging attempts of 
a radicalized extremist, or the cutting-edge art of urban youth recycling the 
extreme imagery they are seeing coming out of the West? What if there was a 
way that researchers could analyze this imagery to identify common themes? 
Fortunately, Kirkley collected hundreds of these images from across Malian 
social media and curated them in to a digital art expo that was presented in 
galleries around the world and on the website sahel-digital-art.com. The 
availability of such a robust database of Malian digital imagery from 2012 to 2013 







                                                 
















                                                 





Figure 8.  Pheno S. “Kani” Album Cover117  
                                                 




Figure 9.  Wiz Khalifa and Ty Dolla $ign “Talk About It in the Morning” 
Album Cover118  
In an attempt to identify notable patterns or messages within the digital 
imagery, a psychological or thematic matrix was built per the example in  
Figure 9. Using potential themes along the x-axis, to include the psychological 
roles of music discussed earlier, 150 images were analyzed. As is the case with 
any scientific inquiry, a review of facts and assumptions is warranted. First, while 
I have conducted research for this thesis, I am not an expert on Malian urban 
culture and do not understand French, Tamashek, or Bambara. Therefore, it is 
quite likely that many of the themes that I have perceived in images may not in 
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fact be the intended messaging of the images’ creators. Thus, it is important to 
understand that this matrix is not intended to accurately measure messages or 
themes being “transmitted” by a particular image or song, but rather to measure 
the message being “received” by the observer of the media. In this respect, the 
objective thematic analysis of digital media can be used to identify cultural 
interpretation differences between two communities. In theory, by using the 
thematic matrix to sample large enough groups from two different cultural 
communities, a researcher could identify potential divergences in artistic 
interpretation between the two groups, not unlike Robert Morey’s experiment 
discussed in the ethnomusicology literature review. Follow-on research, for 
example, might compare my results with the results from a group of Bamako 
urban youth and a group of rural Tuaregs. Utilized this way, the matrix becomes 
a tool to find, fix, and target ethnocentrism, which, per Alan P. Merriam, “must be 
attacked wherever it is found.”119 
In order to conceptually validate the thematic matrix’s utility, the images 
were tagged as either “Tuareg” or “Black African” and then those two groups 
were used for the comparative analysis depicted in Figure 10 and Table 3. The 
research assumes that this categorization for most of the images was accurate. 
There is no way to confirm the actual sources for any of the pictures, so for the 
purpose of this analysis, general categorizations were made that will include a 
margin of error. The results assume that the sample size is large enough to 
account for at least a few errors, since the objective is to identify relative trends 
between the two groups and not to make absolute conclusions regarding either. 
A complete portfolio of the images and the matrix analysis is contained in the 
Appendix and can be utilized for further analysis as necessary. In short, the 
following analytical results should be approached with great caution, and rather 
than conclusions, they should be considered jumping-off points for further 
analysis or deeper dives based on the trends identified. 
                                                 
119 Merriam, The Anthropology of Music, 8. 
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Figure 10.  Digital Art Matrix Analysis120 
The resulting analysis reveals three notable trends in the data. First, 
forging identity appears to be the most common psychological theme across the 
data sample. As seen in Table 3, the distribution of images that forge identity 
between Tuaregs and black Africans roughly matches the overall distribution of 
Tuareg versus black African images across the dataset. Interestingly though, the 
data shows that the Tuareg images that “forge identity” are oriented towards their 
group and Azawad as a whole, whereas the black African images that forge 
identity are more individual in nature. This trend is seen in Table 4, where there 
is an observable divergence between the Tuareg subgroup and the black African 
subgroup in the themes of “self-aggrandizing,” “wealth,” and Western culture.” In 
these cases, the images from southern Malian urban youth appear to be forging 
individual identity as part of a hip-hop or urban culture, whereas the Tuareg 
images forge identity with respect to the new Azawad national identity as 
indicated by the data columns for “Independence” and “Azawad” in Table 4. 
                                                 
120 Source (images): Sahel Digital Art, sahel-digital-art.org, accessed October 2, 2013.  
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Table 3. Imagery Data According to Psychological Function 
 
Table 4. Imagery Data According to Themes 
 
 
Second, Tuareg imagery appears to be significantly less influenced by 
Western culture or hip-hop. By comparison, the majority of the black African 
imagery appears to be south Malian urban youth remaking pictures of 
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themselves or their friends in the image of American hip-hop culture, or in many 
cases, Photoshopping themselves into photos with American superstars like 
Nicki Minaj, Lil Wayne, and Justin Bieber. As stated previously, the general 
subgroup of black African images can be categorized by a desire to present an 
online image reflecting Western culture or gangster rap themes of wealth, fame, 
violence, and self-aggrandizement. By contrast, the Tuareg imagery appears to 
be consumed by the current events of the day and the sense of national unity 
that has arisen from the recent prospect of an independent Tuareg nation, which 
may in part explain the third trend.  
Finally, the data supports an increased instance of “airing grievances” and 
“honoring or commemorating heroes” amongst the Tuareg images relative to the 
black African images as shown in Figure 10. Combine this with the significant 
percentage of Tuareg images containing themes of “military,” “combat,” and 
“independence,” and a narrative begins to shape of a marginalized population 
that may be vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment by violent extremism 
organizations. On its own, this may not be a significant revelation to anyone 
familiar with the history of the Tuareg movement in Mali, but at the very least it 
reinforces previous conclusions and provides an additional perspective or “lens” 
by which analysts can continue to add nuance to the developing narrative. 
In summary, returning again to Dr. Moghaddam’s psychological themes of 
multiculturalism, the data shows that according to my perception of the imagery 
at least, the Tuareg community is driven by a strong sense of group identity 
galvanized around the idea of a free Azawad nation, and that the Tuaregs may 
continue to suffer a collective sense of subjective injustice after years of 
disenfranchisement by the Malian central government. Southern Malian urban 
youth, on the other hand, would appear to be driven by a sense of materialism 
influenced heavily by cultural norms of the West, particularly American hip-hop 
culture. Armed with these results, Malian analysts might consider further 
research in order to validate these findings, and if valid, CVE policy makers 
would be wise to pursue policies that leverage Western culture and hip-hop to 
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shape public opinion among urban youth in Bamako while at the same time 
instituting policies that might compel the central government to address long-
standing grievances among its Tuareg communities in the north. 
3. Mapping the Digital Music Fingerprint 
The third concept for “mapping” music, if technologically feasible, would 
literally map the music. If one accepts the conclusions set forth in the literature 
review that 1) there is a robust peer-to-peer network in the Sahel for the transfer 
of digital music files between phones using Bluetooth technology, and 2) the 
current absence of ubiquitous internet access in the Sahel means that the 
distribution of a specific music file would model that peer-to-peer network without 
being obscured by overarching internet sharing, then it follows that analysts may 
be able to take advantage of this temporary condition in the Sahel to use digital 
music or images on cell phones as a “marker dye” for this peer-to-peer network. 
Further, this ability to map the music network could mark violent extremist 
networks either directly by mapping the flow of extremist themes in the media, or 
indirectly by identifying nodes in the music network that, per theories on network 
convergence in the Sahel, would likely be aligned with nodes in illicit CVE or 
transnational organizational crime networks. In a sense, the model proposed 
here would be the digital music analog of putting a GPS beacon into a carton of 
cigarettes and releasing it on the black market.  
While it is outside the scope and resources available for this thesis to 
conduct an in-depth technical analysis of digital music networks in northern 
Africa, what follows is a proof of concept that models a musical network, or more 
accurately, the geographic dimension to music dispersion within the United 
States. Because the United States presents a data-rich social media environment 
and robust online musical network, it is feasible to show that musical preferences 
tied to geography may identify deeper patterns or networks. By using software to 
observe geo-tagged Twitter feeds containing the word “Bieber” within the United 
States, the maps displayed in Figures 11 and 12 show the correlation between 
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geography and music dispersion over time. The images are separated by 
approximately 40 minutes and show how Tweets about Justin Bieber cluster in 
major urban areas initially, and then spread out from there. It is possible, that this 
geographic relationship may have less to do with an affinity for Justin Bieber and 
more to do with the density of cellular and internet availability in urban centers. 
The absence of the internet and cellular service in the Sahel would therefore 
provide a more geographically “pure” dataset. 
 
Figure 11.  Geotagged “Bieber” Tweets – 1 
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Figure 12.  Geotagged “Bieber” Tweets – 2 
Unfortunately, the relative absence of wired or cellular access to the 
internet in the Sahel would render the software in Figures 11 and 12 useless. 
Therefore, in order to generate similar digital maps for the Sahel, a technology 
would have to be developed and fielded that can detect and access discrete files 
on cell phones at the point of transfer with cellular towers, or more ideally at the 
point of Bluetooth transfer between devices. It is possible that such technology 
already exists, but this research did not reveal any open-source examples of 
systems that could be recommended. Naturally, the technology proposed herein 
would drive potential ethical and legal considerations regarding individual privacy 
but this research is concerned more with the issue of technological possibility, 
rather than ethical suitability. It is reasonable then to conclude that, if a 
technology can be leveraged to inject marked digital files into the Malian digital 
cell phone exchange, and actively access and track those files on cell phones, 
the resulting analysis would show discrete peer-to-peer nodes and relationships 
useful to CVE analysts in the Sahel. Analysts could in fact “map” the digital music 
networks of the Sahel. 
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B. KNOW THE MUSIC, KNOW THE PEOPLE: A BRIEF AND 
INCOMPLETE OVERVIEW OF MALIAN MUSIC AS IT RELATES TO 
MODERN GEOPOLITICS 
By now it should be no surprise that according to this thesis, any analysis 
of the Sahel region of Africa, specifically Mali, is at best incomplete if it does not 
incorporate the musicological landscape of the region. Therefore, the research 
herein would itself not be complete without a brief attempt to provide an overview 
of the traditional and modern musical genres found in Mali. Naturally, the music 
landscape within Mali reflects the ethnic diversity of its population. The major 
musical influence stems from the ancient Mali Empire of the Mandinka. Mande 
people including the Bambara, Mandinka, and Maninka make up 50% of the 
present-day Mali population. However, other ethnic groups like the Fula, Tuareg, 
and Songhay are also present and bring their own cultural and musical 
influences. In very general terms, and simplified greatly for the purpose of this 
research, the music of Mali can be divided into five categories: Traditional Mande 
music, Tuareg music of the northern desert, Fula music, Songhay music, and of 
course, modern music found in the cities of across Mali. Even more generally, 
the musical community of Mali is one of juxtapositions or contradictions, much 
like the nation itself: north versus south, desert versus river delta, old versus 
new, urban versus rural, secularism versus jihadism.  
1. Traditional Music 
Perhaps the most notable facet of Malian traditional music culture is the 
presence of a dedicated “musician” class that enjoys a privileged place in Malian 
society. The jeli, or griot in French are the social class of musicians or orators in 
many West African cultures that are typically sponsored by upper-class patrons 
or nobility.121 The jeli are responsible for maintaining an oral historic tradition of 
the Malian Empire and Mali today, to include recounting genealogical 
information, family events, deeds of ancestors, and encouraging moral behavior 
                                                 
121 Wikipedia, s.v. “Music of Mali,” accessed August 4, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Music_of_Mali. 
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to ensure the honor of their patrons’ family names. The jeli may also perform 
dispute mediation, and are often trusted by their patrons with privileged 
information that may be required for the performance of their griot duties.122 
Finally, the jeli class is endogamous, meaning that particular surnames such as 
Kouyate, Kamissoko, Sissokho, Suomano, Diabete and Kone, are reserved for 
jeli or griots.123 This list presents two points of interest to this research. First, the 
names should be familiar to any aficionado of Malian or West African music, and 
second, the list is almost exclusively Mande. There are no Tuareg surnames 
represented. According to Thomas Hale in “From the Griot of Roots to the Roots 
of Griot: A New Look at the Origins of a Controversial African Term for Bard”: 
The Tuareg, who live in the Sahara and on the northern fringe of 
the Sahel—they are concentrated in northern Mali and Niger as 
well as in southern Algeria—do not have a separate griot tradition. 
But their artisans who work in metal, wood, and leather, known as 
inadan, carry out so many of the functions of griots, such as singing 
songs at weddings and serving as go-betweens, that they cannot 
be excluded entirely from any discussion of the griot world.124 
We will discuss Tuareg music further in following chapters, but for now it is 
important to understand that the concept of the griot that many assume to be 
fundamental to Malian social structure and musical community does not perhaps 
apply in the northern Sahel region of Mali, where the ethnicity and musical 
culture is predominantly Tuareg or Berber. Therefore, any policy approach to 
engagement with the whole of Mali, and not just the Mande majority represented 
in the south and by the central Malian government, should be informed by this 
nuance. For the purpose of this research, “traditional” Malian music will be 
considered as the traditional Mande music to include its modern manifestations 
and Tuareg music will be considered separately. 
                                                 
122 Wikipedia, s.v. “Music of Mali.” 
123 Ibid. 
124 Thomas Hale, “From the Griot of Roots to the Roots of Griot: A New Look at the Origins 
of a Controversial African Term for Bard,” Oral Tradition 12, no. 2 (1997): 267. 
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The traditional Mande music is characterized by instrumentation specific 
to the West African music community, and in some instances specific to the 
regional music community of Mali. The melodic instruments are typically built 
around a pentatonic, or five note per octave, structure and include the kora, a 
21–25 string lute harp, the n’goni, a 4–7 string lute believed to be the 
predecessor of the American banjo, and the balafon, a slat xylophone with small 
gourd resonators.125 Percussion instruments include the fileh, a hand drum 
fashioned from a calibash gourd, the gita, a calibash gourd with beads or kowri 
shells attached, the djembe, a large Congo-style animal skin drum, and the 
dunun, a cylindrical mallet drum with rawhide at both ends. 
Much of the music being produced in Mali today is influenced by the 
traditional Mande style, and the artists making it have gained recognition around 
the world. Salif Keita, long considered an “ambassador of Malian music” has 
ancestral roots to Soundjata Keita, the founder of the Malian Empire in 1240, and 
has been making music since 1969 with the “Griots” and collaborated with 
Western artist like Carlos Santana. Toumani Diabete and Bassekou Kouyate are 
famous throughout West Africa and around the world for their mastery of the 
Kora and Ngoni, respectively, and their ability to incorporate modern and 
Western musical concepts into their traditional styles. More recent artists like 
blind husband and wife duo Amadou Bagayoko and Miriam Doumbia, known to 
the world simply as “Amadou and Miriam,” continue the tradition of exporting 
Malian music to the world. The duo has been nominated for a Grammy and 
graced stages across the world from Coachella to Glastonberry music festivals. 
Amadou and Miriam recorded the official anthem of the 2006 FIFA World Cup 
and in 2010 shared the stage of the FIFA World Cup opening ceremonies in 
South Africa with Western mega-stars like Alicia Keys and Shakira, and lesser-
known group Tinariwen, a world-famous Tuareg desert blues band also hailing 
                                                 
125 Wikipedia, “Music of Mali,” 1. 
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from Mali.126 Tinariwen will be discussed further in the following section. These 
two Malian bands performing together on a world stage represented both the 
music of the marginalized Berber people of northern Mali as well as the proud 
heritage of the Mande Empire and modern Mali nationalism; two-sides of a 
decades-long friction that less than two years later would be leveraged by 
Islamist extremists to takeover over the whole north of Mali. This nuanced irony 
was likely lost on the 80,000 fans in the stands and hundreds of millions watching 
on TVs all over the world.  
2. Tuareg Music 
Vocal performance is a fundamental element of the Tuareg musical 
tradition and is characterized by the terelilit, a trilled vocal call unique to the 
region. A type of violin called the imzhad, and the tendi, an African drum, often 
accompanies the vocals. Recorded examples of traditional music include 
wedding songs, hunting songs, and camel songs, perhaps indicating the 
importance of the animal to the nomadic people.127 The musical influences stem 
from the Berber Empire, which at its height spread from the Atlas Mountains in 
Morocco to Niger and Algeria in the east. Here we see a useful example of a 
geographic musical community that is not perfectly aligned to the corresponding 
geography of the nations within which it operates. This is important, because 
geographically, this musical community generally represents the region that 
many marginalized modern Tuaregs would consider to represent Azawad, the 
name given to an independent Tuareg nation that many thought had been 
achieved briefly in the initial days following the rebellion of 2012. This musical 
commonality certainly plays a role in defining intergroup relationships in the 
Sahel that are in conflict with ideals of post-colonial nationalism in the region. 
                                                 
126 Wikipedia, s.v., “Amadou and Mariam,” accessed August 11, 2016, https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amadou_%26_Mariam. 
127 “Tuareg Music of the Southern Sahara—Various Artists—Description,” Smithsonian 
Folkways, accessed August 11, 2016, http://www.folkways.si.edu/tuareg-music-of-the-southern-
sahara/, islamica-world/album/smithsonian. 
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One cannot consider the modern Tuareg musical community without 
including the desert guitar band Tinariwen, whose creation story “burgeons with 
myth and mythos in their home country and beyond,”128 and presents a vignette 
representative of the entire Tuareg rebellion movement. Per the band’s own 
website, founding member Ibrahim Ag Alhabib witnessed his father’s death at the 
age of four and built his own guitar from a bicycle wire, stick, and tin can. It is not 
uncommon to see the band romantically described across the internet as 
“nomads of the Sahara desert who ride on horseback with Stratocasters and AK-
47’s at their side.”129 The band formed in the 1980s in Libyan training and 
refugee camps, where young Tuareg men were now seeking work after having 
left their homes in Mali and Niger fleeing drought and lack of opportunity. This 
diasporic group of disenfranchised young Tuaregs, referred to collectively as 
“Ishumar,” a Tamashek adaptation of the French word “chomeur,” meaning 
“unemployed” or “jobless person,” would eventually become the foot soldiers of 
the Mali rebellions of 1990.130 According to the band’s own website: 
Disillusioned by the promises of Quaddafi at the time, the Tuareg 
became restless again and longed for home. But the interaction 
with city life yielded unexpected consequences, they became 
exposed to western music—most notably the guitar-driven anthems 
of Jimi Hendrix and the American blues—which they mixed with 
their own soulful dirges which they’d perform in the camps by the 
fire with battery-operated amps. When revolution broke out back in 
Mali, they left Libya behind, hung up their guitars and picked up 
guns to fight for the Tuareg independence. When the dischord died 
down, the band returned to music, delivering songs imbued with 
aching beauty and lonesome poetry. Their music was bootlegged 
and traded around the region, earning them a devout following.131 
This description of the Tinariwen “creation myth” demonstrates a few 
concepts key to this research. First, it acknowledges the coming together of 
                                                 
128 Tinariwen, “Tinariwen Emmaar,” Musical Band Homepage, accessed August 11, 2016, 
http://tinariwen.com/bio-eng/. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Morgan, Music, Culture and Conflict in Mali, 47. 
131 Tinariwen, “Tinariwen Emmaar.” 
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musical communities in way that will eventually enhance the exportability of 
Tinariwen’s music and in turn any messaging that the band might be 
incorporating in to this music. As discussed in Chapter III, Merriam would likely 
view this merging of musical styles as a potential softening of the “barriers to 
communicability” between communities that cross-cultural music diversity often 
presents. Hence, it represents a pathway for communicability between the West 
and Tuareg diaspora through music. Second, this passage highlights the often 
inseparable intermingling between a musician’s or band’s own history, personal 
experience, and the collective experiences of the musical community it 
represents. In this way, whether they intended it or not, Tinariwen bears a 
political responsibility or at least expectation to leverage their music 
psychologically to forge identity and air grievances as proposed by Dr. Lemieux 
in the literature review. Tinariwen’s history and music are so intertwined, that it is 
easy to forgive those who conjure images of the band roaming the Saharan 
Desert with guitars over one shoulder and rifles over the other, whether 
exaggerated or not. Finally, the abovementioned passage alludes to the 
mechanism by which the music of Tinariwen spread regionally via bootlegging 
and trading, before the band was an international superstar. This is important 
because it reinforces the ideas discussed in the communication theory section of 
the literature review. This process of bootlegging live performances in the 
absence of formal recording studios, and then trading these recordings on tapes 
across the region highlights the existing informal infrastructure for music 
exchange and informs researchers on the digital version in use today that 
essentially leverages the same process and infrastructure.  
It is worth noting that in the case of a band like Tinariwen, their music can 
accomplish the psychological purposes previously outlined by Dr. Limieux in two 
general ways. The musician or music itself can overtly forge identity, air 
grievances, commemorate heroes, and dehumanize enemies through the lyrics 
and associated imagery, but alternatively, even if the music is not overtly political 
or its creator bent on psychological purposes, it can still be leveraged by a 
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musical community to reinforce cultural identity or as a beacon of heritage 
around which a group can rally. Tinariwen’s songs are written primarily in French 
or Tamashek, and absent translation it is difficult to present examples of overt 
messaging through their lyrics for the purpose of this research. Therefore, the 
testimony of band member Ag Leche will have to suffice: 
The new songs of this album talk about what we feel today, the 
tuareg issues, the need of being recognized by the administration 
of our country. But also some poetic ways of describing our 
feelings. The Tamasheq language is using a lot of metaphors, and 
it comes from the old traditional Tuareg poetry that tells about the 
Tuareg tribes, their adventures in the desert, the wars, but also the 
beauty of the desert, the sky, the lands, and the assouf, our blues, 
and nostalgia of an old time.132 
In his description, Ag Leche confirms the overt intent of the musicians to 
address current issues affecting their community (airing of grievances) and to 
honor traditional Tuareg tribes and their adventures and wars (commemorating 
heroes and historic events). At the same time, his references to the “beauty of 
the desert, the sky, the lands” and to “our blues” and to the “nostalgia of an old 
time” hint at the more ephemeral qualities of their music that are powerful 
instruments in forging the identity of a community or shaping the common 
narrative of a cultural specific group. In the case of the Tuareg, this identity is one 
of nomadic independence rooted in the rugged beauty of the desert and the 
history of their people.  
Even a cursory or anecdotal understanding of the Tinariwen backstory 
provides a dimension of analysis that might not otherwise be available to an 
analyst trying to achieve a deep understanding of the intergroup dynamics at play 
in northern Mali in 2012. While this ethnomusical dimension cannot be expected 
to provide a comprehensive analysis on its own, and while similar insights might 
likely be ascertained through different avenues of approach, the ethnomusical 
                                                 
132 Tinariwen, “Tinariwen Emmaar.” 
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analysis nonetheless provides another tool to the regional security analyst tasked 
with providing clarity to the all to complex dynamics of regional geopolitics. 
3. Fula and Songhai Music 
The Fulani or Fula are a pastoral nomadic people that, like the Tuaregs 
and Mande, can trace their history back centuries and are dispersed across West 
Africa and several countries. In Mali, the Fulani are primarily centered around the 
Mopti region along the banks of the Niger River. Like other Malian musical 
communities, the Fula enjoy a rich musical culture with their own traditional 
instruments and numerous sub-groups. Traditional instruments include the 
hoddu, a plucked skin-covered lute similar to the ngoni, and riti, and single-string 
bowed instrument similar to a violin. Fulani music reflects traditional life and like 
other African music, is often specific to occasions or activities, such as herding 
cattle, working in the fields, preparing food, etc. Music in Fulani culture is an 
integral element of village life, with songs and drums playing a significant role in 
daily activities like cultivating and harvesting the fields.133  
The Malian blues guitarist Ali Farke Toure comes from Fula and Songhai 
roots and is perhaps the most world famous of Malian musicians. Born in 1939 to 
a farming family on the banks of the Niger River in the Tombouctou region of 
Mali, Toure took up the guitar in the mid-1950s and following the Malian 
independence from France in 1960, became the leader of the Nianfunke village 
cultural troupe, responsible for preserving local culture.134 Merging West African 
music traditions with the American blues, Farke’s music reached a world-wide 
audience and eventually earned him two Grammy Awards. His musical tradition 
was famously referred to by American filmmaker Martin Scorsese as the “DNA of 
blues,” hinting at the ethnomusicological overlap of music communities that 
exists between West African music and American blues. 
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134 Jon Pareles and “Ali Farka Touré, Grammy-Winning Musician of West Africa, Dies,” New 
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Toure was not only considered a Malian cultural ambassador to the rest of 
Africa and to the world, but he was also considered by many an ambassador 
between the myriad cultural groups within Mali. During the Tuareg rebellions of 
the 1990s, Ali Farka Toure’s singing in all of the region’s languages, Songhai, 
Fulani, and Tamashek, was considered a symbol of peacemaking.135  
Before his death in 2006, Farka Toure retired from touring and returned to 
his farming roots in Mali, where he was elected mayor of the Niafunke region and 
established the Ali Farka Toure Foundation to support young Malian 
musicians.136 His musical tradition and political activism is carried on by his son 
Vieux Farke Toure, whose music has garnered world-wide recognition on its 
own. Of note, an enduring collaboration with renowned Israeli pianist Idan 
Raichel has been described as “a powerful testimonial to the power of art and 
fraternity to transcend vast cultural and political divides.”137 Vieux Farka Toure’s 
own feelings on the Toure-Raichel Collective Project demonstrate the unique 
power of music to bridge cultural, political, and religious barriers, but also the 
inclusive secularism for which Mali is typically regarded: 
People ask me all the time why I am doing this, and I tell them that 
for me it’s not about religion. Your religion is for you, mine is for me, 
and it’s not because I am a Muslim and he is something else that 
we did something together. I am open to all music coming from 
everywhere in the world. We should not say, “O.K. I am a Jew, so I 
will not play with Muslims,” or “I am a Muslim, so I will not play with 
Christians.” That’s why we have problems in this world.138 
The worldview expressed by Toure in this quote is one that is not 
uncommon to musicians or artists seeking to communicate across cultural 
boundaries, and is at the heart of this researcher’s thesis that musical 
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commonalities can be leveraged to counter the incubation or spread of violent 
extremism in disenfranchised or marginalized communities. 
4. Modern Rap and Hip-Hop 
While many Malian musicians are making modern music in the tradition of 
Malian music types outlined earlier, this section focuses on modern hip-hop and 
the urban youth music movement in Mali and their roles leading up to and 
following the coup. When rap first arrived in Mali in the mid-1980s, the Malian 
youth mimicked the American and French rappers. By the late 1980s, rap groups 
were popping up all over Mali, and Malian rappers were beginning to rap in their 
own language, Bambara.139 In the 1990s, following the 1991 overthrow of 
Moussa Traore’s military dictatorship, Malian rap earned its place on the frontline 
of commentary against the increasingly corrupt and nepotistic government. Rap 
threesome Tata Pound, named after the ancient wall protecting the city of 
Sikasso against invaders, paved the way with songs like “Cikan President” 
(“Message to the President”) and “Fatobougou” (“The Village of Madmen”). 
“President…corruption, we don’t want it! Nepotism…we don’t want it! Robbing 
from the state…we don’t want it!”140 They were accurately expressing the 
collective disdain of the youth at the time, but their style or approach did not 
necessarily sit well with the more traditional A-list musicians. 
Per Malian tradition and customs, openly accusing or insulting someone 
directly is against cultural norms, and in the old days, this was the sole 
responsibility of the griot. There is some friction then between griots and modern 
rappers. The griots generally consider the rappers disrespectful and criticize their 
lack of mogoya, a Bamana word meaning “the capacity to manage and 
communicate feelings with tact and restraint.”141 Rappers for their part have little 
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tolerance for the griots’ doublespeak and over-proclivity for deference, not to 
mention the privileged relationships griots enjoy with their upper-class 
patrons.142 According to rapper Mylmo, “The griots are there to sing praises. But 
they ignore the negative side. So in a way, rap is there to fill in the gap.”143  
In the months leading up to the 2012 coup, Malian rappers were all too 
happy to fill in the gaps for the politicians in Bamako, but no one was listening, or 
if they were, they were not doing anything about it. In 2011, rapper and activist 
Amkoullel wrote “SOS” with Mylmo, a song about the “disastrous situation in the 
country.”144 According to Amkoullel, “Everyone in Mali, especially in Bamako, felt 
that something was going to happen.” Eight months later it did. 
Almost immediately following the 2012 coup, rappers banded together to 
form activist groups and collectively cry out against what was happening. 
Members of Tata Pound formed Les Sofas de la Republique, named after the 
sofa warriors of the Manding Empire, particularly the sofas fighting for Malian 
hero Samory Toure, who held back the colonial French armies in the late 19th 
century.145 As described earlier, this is a clear example of music being used to 
commemorate heroes and historic events, as discussed earlier. Amkoullel started 
his own collective called Plus Jamais Ca! (Never Again). These collectives wrote 
songs and made videos condemning the coup and calling for change in Mali, but 
in the end, it is important to note that their grievances were not the grievances of 
the Tuaregs in the north. The call for a united democratic Mali likely did little to 
satisfy the underlying issues affecting the Tuaregs. Based on this research it 
appears that rappers in Bamako were concerned more about the coup than 
about the Islamist takeover in the north, but that assessment warrants further 
research and validation. 
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The overview of Malian music presented in the preceding sections barely 
scratches the surface, but even so, it begins to provide an idea of the complexity 
of the musical and cultural dynamics in the country. In order to realize the full 
potential of the “lens” functionality proposed for this framework, dedicated 
ethnomusicologists would need to be assigned, and people like Tinariwen 
manager-turned-journalist Andy Morgan or Festival au Desert producer Manny 
Ansar, both of whom who have years of experience in the Mali music scene, 
should be consulted.  
C. AKOUNAK TEDALAT TAHA TAZOUGHAI (“RAIN THE COLOR OF 
BLUE WITH A LITTLE RED IN IT”): CITIZEN DIPLOMACY THROUGH 
MUSICAL ENGAGEMENT 
The third approach or function of the ethnomusicology framework 
recommended herein is the most critical because it addresses the root causes of 
and not just the symptoms of violent extremism. By using ethnomusicology, or 
more accurately music, as a bridge to engage populations that may be 
vulnerable to radicalization, counterterrorism policymakers can eliminate the 
space within which violent extremist organizations can recruit and survive. In 
particular, this branch of the framework espouses a whole-of-nation approach 
that fully leverages the vibrant U.S. and global music industry in addition to U.S. 
and non-governmental organization operations to horizontally engage at-risk 
populations through music. What follows are examples of projects that could be 
supported via grants through TSCTP funding, for instance, in order to promote 
engagement via musical common ground in Mali and the Sahel. 
1. The Tuareg Purple Rain 
In 2015, ethnomusicologist Christopher Kirkley released the Tamashek-
language film Akounak Tedalat Taha Tazoughai, which literally translates to “rain 
the color of blue with a little red in it.”146 This Tuareg remake of Prince’s 1984 
                                                 
146 Christopher Kirkley, Akounak Tedalat Taha Tazoughai, Drama, Musical, Romance, 
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cult classic Purple Rain chronicles the fictional but autobiographical rise of 
Tuareg guitarist Mdou Moctar. The effort began as a kick-starter project 
completely unrelated to formal policy on counter violent extremism, but it can be 
argued that the project and others like it are complementary to regional CVE 
efforts for a couple of reasons. First, the project provided a vehicle, however 
small, for Mdou Moctar and other Tuareg participants in the project to present 
their culture and forge their identity in a way for a potential global audience. 
Although the script was originally based on Purple Rain, the actors made 
changes to the story to better reflect their own lives. According to Kirkley, “The 
actors constantly vetoed their lines and changed scenarios to create something 
that was more accurate, more culturally [and] personally appropriate.”147 
Second, the project had a direct impact on Mdou Moctar’s musical career, 
fueling follow-on tours to Europe, Canada, and the United States.148 In this way, 
the project affords Moctar and others like him to air their grievances informally, or 
in some cases formally, on the global stage. By providing a constructive voice or 
outlet for disenfranchised populations like the Tuareg in Northern Mali and Niger, 
music can provide an essential relief valve that can go a long way toward 
preventing radicalization “left of bang.” As discussed earlier, this concept is 
particularly potent in a region like the Sahel, where music and oral history is such 
a foundational component of the cultural of both Tuareg and black African ethnic 
groups. 
Finally, the project provides a window for Western observers into a largely 
misunderstood corner of the world. It provides a “lens” through which the public 
and analysts alike might challenge or confirm their preconceptions. What better 
way to challenge ethnocentrism than to take something as uniquely Western as 
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Prince’s Purple Rain and offer it to Saharan Desert youth for re-interpretation. 
The title in and of itself serves as a red warning flag to any intrepid Western 
observer preparing to take the plunge into understanding the cultural dynamics of 
the Sahel. “We were going to change [the title] for the actual release, but 
everyone in Niger already knows it by the title.” Kirkley said, “And there’s 
something poetic about it, something in the title that reflects our own attempt at 
cross-cultural translation.”149 
2. The Festival Au Desert 
It was a bold idea… “After many conversations and cups of bitter syrupy 
tea they decided to stage a festival of Taureg music and culture in the desert 
around the first full moon of the new millennium.”150 A year later, in January 
2001, the Association Efes, a Mali-based organization to forward the social, 
political, and cultural development of Mali’s north, with help from Tinariwen, 
French group Lo’Jo, and several French and Malian funders held the first Festival 
au Desert in Tin Esseko a small village east of Kidal.151 By 2003, the festival had 
come in to its own and with attendees like Robert Plant, the legendary front man 
for Led Zeppelin, the event had established a worldwide reputation. Like the 
projects discussed in the previous section, significant cultural events like the 
Festival au Desert can go a long way toward inoculating a region or population to 
the pressure of violent extremism. Unfortunately, this would not be the case for 
the Festival au Desert. 
Shortly after the 2003 festival, European hostages were kidnapped in 
Southern Algeria, the same hostages whose freedom eventual Ansur ud-Dine 
leader Iyad Ag Ghali would help negotiate. Then in 2007, the GSPC pledged 
allegiance to al Qaeda and became AQIM, spurring a series of travel warnings 
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for the north of Mali from foreign ministries in Europe and America.152 In 2010, 
the State Department issued a document advising all Americans against traveling 
to Timbuktu and “to the world-renowned Festival in the Desert.”153 What if, as a 
matter of policy, the State Department had done just the opposite? What if, 
through the TSCTP, the State Department made it a subsidiary objective to work 
with the Malian government and security forces in the north to ensure security for 
the Festival au Desert, and then encouraged American participation by promoting 
increased cultural engagement? This course of action might have served two 
objectives. First it could have provided opportunities to further the TSCTP’s 
border security and law enforcement lines of effort through focused cooperation 
with Malian security forces. Second, germane to this research, cooperation 
around the production and execution of the Festival au Desert would provide 
situational awareness invaluable to ongoing CVE operations in the area. It is 
“hearts and minds” at its best. 
The Malian security forces did in fact provide security and Westerners 
continued to attend the Festival au Desert. The festival director, Manny Ansar, 
was able to leverage relationships with members of the Tuareg rebel movement 
to ensure safety for the festival. “They were people with wide connections who 
knew the currents and pressure points of Saharan politics.”154 Ironically, Ansar 
recalls Bono, the lead singer of U2, asking him to call off the soldiers directed to 
protect him at the 2012 festival.  
I said to the military, “Look, if he wants to go off like that, just let him 
do it.” He used to wander off in the dunes; we would take tea there. 
People think I had some kind of divine force to protect my visitors. 
And finally, I almost ask myself if it isn’t true. Imagine, Bono 
kidnapped!155 
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Less than three months later, Ansar ud-Dine took control of Timbuktu and the 
Festival au Desert was forced in to exile. According to Manny Ansar: 
I understood that my only way to resist was to continue to be 
involved in music, to continue promoting festivals. It was my way of 
fighting back and showing that you can’t kill music just because 
Timbuktu has been occupied, that Tuareg and Malian music will be 
heard even more and even further afield. Before our music was 
heard in Essakane, at the Tamadacht Festival or in Essouk. Today 
it’ll be heard in all the big festivals in the world. So it is the opposite 
of what you, the Islamists, want. It is our victory and your defeat.156 
The Festival au Desert remains in exile today, but bringing the festival back to 
Timbuktu, or even better back to the dunes of Essakane, would present an 
enormous moral victory for the people of Mali against violent extremism in their 
country. 
3. Music Production and Music Industry Projects 
The music industry itself is an ideal avenue of approach for citizen 
diplomacy in Mali. Mali has already established itself as a global musical 
powerhouse, but there is still significant room to grow, particular in the way of 
musical production capabilities and more importantly, making those capabilities 
available to a wider group of up-and-coming Malian musicians. The benefits to 
expanded commercial engagement though the American music industry in Mali 
are tri-fold in that they can serve ethnomusicological, economic, and security 
objectives. In her paper, “Music Production as a Tool of Research, and Impact,” 
ethnomusicologist Lucy Duran proposes that an album or CD, “produced with a 
sensitivity to a musical culture nurtured by long research, has the potential to 
have far greater impact than a publication in a scholarly journal.”157 Duran 
considers this a form of “research-based practice” versus “practice-based 
research,” and this approach is fundamental to the citizen diplomacy methods 
proposed in this thesis. 
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Economically, it is unlikely that the music industry will provide the ultimate 
solution for Malians. Mali remains among the 25 poorest nations in the world and 
gold and cotton make up 80% percent of its export. The country is developing its 
iron ore extraction capability in an effort to diversify, but for all intents and 
purposes, agriculture and mining will remain the mainstay of the national gross 
domestic product and it is unlikely that a developed music industry will have a 
significant impact on the numbers. However, in areas like the deserts of the north 
and the city centers of the south where agriculture is not a viable option and the 
unemployment rate is 30%, there is the potential that efforts made to foster an 
independent music industry could provide at least some economic relief. 
Engagement and investment by the U.S. music industry can provide jobs for 
more than just musicians. It can offer opportunities for Malian youth to pursue 
jobs in production, promotion, artist management, etc. 
Increased private industry investment in local Malian music production can 
enhance security and CVE efforts, by “filling in” the spaces within the population 
where violent extremism is able to incubate, similar to the other citizen diplomacy 
recommendations. Malians are proud of their music and the support they get 
from the rest of the world is not lost on the musicians.  
I’m taking this opportunity to thank the entire European, American, 
Asian music business for its support for the cause of Malian music. 
And the people who come and learn music here, or even people 
who buy tickets to go and see the different Malian musicians in 
concert, I take this opportunity to say thanks and bravo to you all, 
may the struggle continue. 
—Toumani Diabate, Malian Kora Player158 
Conventionally, government efforts to leverage music as a tool to counter 
violent extremism is oriented in the realm of information operations and 
messaging to counter the messaging of violent extremist organizations (VEO). 
While this research considers this a valid use of music for CVE, it is important to 
emphasize that this is not the intent of the “bridge” approach of the proposed 
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map-lens-bridge framework. The private-sector engagement discussed earlier is 
based on music for the sake of music, and in that sense must be free of any 
governmental ulterior motive in order to maintain authenticity and be effective in 
the long run.  
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following list of implementation recommendations starts broadly with 
an overall expansion to whole-of-nation approach to CVE and narrows to include 
specific recommendations for applying ethnomusicology for CVE according to the 
map-lens-bridge framework. It is not comprehensive but rather intended to 
provide some ideas for policy-makers. Further, it is critical to recognize that 
although the framework is built on three different lines of effort (target, learn, and 
engage), these lines of effort are not mutually exclusive or intended to have a 
sequential relationship. This research proposes that a successful strategy for 
tackling violent extremism in the Sahel will involve effectively orchestrating the 
execution of operations across the entire framework in parallel and targeting bad 
actors while at the same time engaging the at-risk populations they seek to 
radicalize. To implement this research, U.S. policy makers should consider the 
following: 
1. Adopt a whole-of-nation approach modeled after cyber 
security or fragile state policy. As recent reports have shown, 
TSCTP has been successful achieving multi-agency cooperation 
for a whole-of-government approach via the 3Ds: defense, 
diplomacy, and development. To maximize results, the program 
should identify whole-of-nation or private-sector activities that are 
operating relative to each of its lines of effort and leverage the 3Cs 
to ensure non-governmental and private efforts in the region are 
coherent, coordinated, and complementary to TSCTP efforts. 
2. Draft a strategy to implement ethnomusicology as a 
fundamental element of the whole-of-nation approach: The 
ethnomusicology aspect could be implemented as either a separate 
line of effort synchronizing government, NGO, and private-sector 
engagement through music. Alternatively, ethnomusicology could 
be incorporated into the “counter spread of violent extremist 
ideologies” line of effort. 
3. Fund an ethnomusicologist advisor to TSCTP’s Standing 
Interagency Working Group (SIWG): The SIWG meets monthly in 
Washington, DC, and monitors resource allocation, interagency 
coordination, and strategic objectives. Absent a permanently 
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funded staff organization for TSCTP, this working group would be 
the best place for a dedicated ethnomusicologist. 
4. Fund grants for the U.S. private-sector music industry to 
engage with the Mali music industry: The research supports the 
notion that Malians consider music as one of their staple exports. 
Therefore, a healthy relationship between the Western music 
industry and the musicians, producers, and venues of Mali should 
be a foundational aspect of U.S. economic exchange with Mali. By 
funding grants to support private and academic music projects, 
TSCTP can promote coherence and coordination and more 
focused government activities through Voices of America or USAID. 
5. Support reestablishment of Festival au Desert in Timbuktu: 
Prior to 2012, the Festival au Desert was the dominant international 
symbol for northern Mali and Mali as a whole. Resumption of the 
annual festival alone is a worthy objective of counterterrorism policy 
in the Sahel, and once resumed, the festival will facilitate continued 
whole-of-nation engagement opportunities in the long term. This 
objective also provides an opportunity to synchronize government 
activities, like border security and law enforcement with non-
government and private activities, such as the production and 
management of the festival. 
6. Fund research and development for tracking file transfer over 
Bluetooth or cellular networks: The development and 
implementation of technology to track discrete digital artifacts 
through the cellular networks in the Sahel could be funded through 
government agencies like the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency or the Office of the Secretary of Defense Joint 
Test and Evaluation. Alternatively, private-sector innovation could 
be leveraged through the new DOD “venture capital” arm, Defense 




The research conducted herein validates the applicability of 
ethnomusicology as a framework to enhance counterterrorism policy and 
operations in the Sahel. By merging Alan P. Merriam’s concepts on the 
responsibilities of ethnomusicologists (technical, academic, social/behavioral) 
and his theoretical research model for ethnomusicology (music, behavior, 
concept), the resulting map-lens-bridge (target, learn, engage) framework 
provides policy makers and practitioners with a focused method to leverage 
ethnomusicology to counter violent extremism. By pursuing the 
recommendations outlined in this research, policy makers can incorporate 
ethnomusicology as an innovative line of effort by which CVE programs like 
TSCTP can be expanded to a whole-of-nation approach that more effectively 
targets the core vulnerabilities in the Sahel. 
A. RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
The map-lens-bridge framework can also guide follow-on research to this 
thesis. In the effort to map peer-to-peer networks in the Sahel, further 
technological research and development should be conducted to confirm that the 
proposal is in fact feasible, and to take the proof of concept through to execution. 
Further, researchers can leverage existing technology for mapping social media 
networks to further enhance the ability to map music-related networks in the 
region. Once internet or cellular technology becomes widely available in the 
Sahel, the window of opportunity to map the digital footprint of the physical peer-
to-peer network for music sharing will come to an end. 
From the “lens” perspective, there should be further and more detailed 
research into the current music and digital media being created in the Sahel. 
Specifically, areas of commonality between up-and-coming artists from both 
regions might be researched and provide indicators for future collaboration. True 
academic ethnomusicology research in the Sahel should be conducted in support 
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of continuing operations to counter violent extremism in the Sahel. Additionally, 
the digital imagery psychological matrix analysis conducted in this thesis should 
be used to conduct a comparative analysis between Tuareg, black African, and 
Western sample groups.  
Finally, follow-on research for establishing an enduring engagement 
“bridge” through music in Mali needs to focus on the academic and economic 
requirements. Further research on business development opportunities and 
social benefits of academic music and art programs for youth in Mali is warranted 
in order to understand how best to tailor engagement across the patchwork of 
ethnicities and cultures represented in Mali. The “research-based practice” 
approach espoused by ethnomusicologist Lucy Duran and discussed earlier 
might be an excellent start.   
B. THE WORLD WOULD HEAR MY SONG 
In the meantime, French and Malian military forces have driven the 
Islamists out of the urban centers of northern Mali. In many ways, things in Mali 
are back to normal. But below the surface, friction between the Tuaregs and their 
fellow black African Malians still exists and will continue to present an opportunity 
for violent extremist organizations and transnational organized crime syndicates 
that operate in the Sahel to recruit and radicalize marginalized youth. Andy 
Morgan’s somewhat prophetic assessment from 15 years ago, following the 2001 
Festival au Desert remains tragically relevant, almost de ja vu. 
Many of the old combatants now realise that the fight must be 
pursued with the weapons of media and mass communications, 
rather than swords and Kalashnikovs. Up until now theirs has been 
a largely hidden war, known to only a few mainly French desert 
enthusiasts and experts. On the back of the festival there have 
been prominent features in the French daily Liberation, The Times 
of England, Uncut Magazine and Billboard.... The recordings of 
Tinariwen are likely to surface either this year or early next year as 
a CD with European or even worldwide distribution. These are 
major victories in a propaganda war which has only really just 
begun. Despite their geographical isolation the Touaregs are astute 
and aware political observers. Listening to the BBC world service is 
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a favourite pastime and they are acutely aware that they need to 
use these new weapons of mass communication if they are to have 
any hope to achieving their aims. As one of Tinariwen songs go: “If 
I could sing so that those in London could hear, then the whole 
world would hear my song.”159 
One Grammy, eleven festivals, thirteen months of Sharia law, and a Purple Rain 
remake later, the disenfranchised Tuaregs of Northern Mali continue to sing out, 
but it remains to be seen whether the world will truly hear their song. 
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Figure 13.  Imagery Data Collection.163 
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